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Brown v. City of Las Cruces Police Department

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

August 21, 2019

DAVALOUS JAMON BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LAS CRUCES POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF, DOÑA ANA COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; DOÑA ANA COUNTY DETENTION CENTER; CHASE DUVANELL; BRAD LUNSFORD; ENRIQUE KIKI VIGIL; JAIME MONTOYA; KENNETH DANIEL GALLEGOS MIYAGISHIMA and CHRIS BARELA, Defendants.

          MAGISTRATE JUDGE&#3');">39;S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

          JERRY H. RITTER, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s Motion for Pretrial Conference and Telephonic Hearings; Scheduling Order and Case Management, filed on December 21');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18 [Doc. 28]; Defendants&#3');">39; First Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Heck v. Humphrey and Qualified Immunity, filed on January 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 [Doc. 3');">33');">3]; Defendants&#3');">39; Second Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s Claims Under State Law, filed on January 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 [Doc. 3');">34');">4]; Defendants&#3');">39; Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Qualified Immunity, filed on January 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 [Doc. 3');">35]; and Defendants&#3');">39; Motion to Strike Plaintiff&#3');">39;s Surreply, filed on April 29, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 [Doc. 4');">45]. On September 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 63');">36(b)(1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1)(B) and (b)(3');">3), United States District Judge James O. Browning referred the case to United States Magistrate Judge Jerry H. Ritter “to conduct hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case.” [Doc. 2].

         Having carefully considered the parties&#3');">39; submissions and the relevant law, and for the reasons outlined below, I recommend that summary judgment be granted against Plaintiff&#3');">39;s claims directed toward Defendants Lunsford, Montoya, and Miyagishima and that Plaintiff&#3');">39;s remaining claims against Defendants Montoya, Barela, and the Las Cruces Police Department be dismissed.

         I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1" name="FN1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1" id="FN1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1]

         On July 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">4, Xavia Gutierrez, the mother of Plaintiff&#3');">39;s children reported that she and Plaintiff were involved in a domestic dispute at her residence in Las Cruces, New Mexico. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-7');">7, p3');">3');">p. 3');">3');">3');">3');">p. 3');">3-5]. In her statement to LCPD officers, Ms. Gutierrez said that when she arrived home on July 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">4, Plaintiff approached her wanting to talk about their relationship. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-7');">7, 3');">3');">p. 3');">3');">3');">3');">p. 3');">3]. When Ms. Gutierrez asked him to leave, Plaintiff reached into the driver&#3');">39;s side of her vehicle, where she was sitting, grabbed her by the throat and pushed her into the passenger seat. [Id., 4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4]. Plaintiff drove around the area, continuing to hold Ms. Gutierrez by the throat. [Id.]. He refused to let her out of the vehicle and held her by her legs when she attempted to get out. [Id.]. Plaintiff drove Ms. Gutierrez back to her residence and exited the vehicle. [Id.]. Ms. Gutierrez called 91');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 and requested assistance. [Id.]. She was then able to regain control of her vehicle and get away. [Id.]. As she attempted to pull away from her residence, Plaintiff jumped on the hood of her car and threatened to kill her. [Id.]. Ms. Gutierrez managed to drive away. [Id.]. She and stopped at nearby convenience store and called 91');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 again. [Id.]. Officer Renteria of the LCPD responded to Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; residence where a male matching Plaintiff&#3');">39;s description fled on foot, ignoring the officer&#3');">39;s directions to stop. [Id.]. Officer J. Roman of the LCPD responded to the convenience store where he took Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; statement and noted that it was supported by physical evidence on both Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; person and vehicle. [Id.]. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff was charged with battery against a household member; criminal damage to property; and resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-2, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1; Doc. 3');">33');">3-7');">7, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1]. A warrant was issued for Plaintiff&#3');">39;s arrest. [Id.].

         On the morning of July 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">4, at Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; suggestion, Plaintiff went to Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; residence. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 3');">3]. While Plaintiff was using Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; shower, she contacted Deputy Thouvenell of the LCPD, who arrived at the residence to arrest Plaintiff, pursuant to the warrant. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 3');">3');">p. 3');">3');">3');">3');">p. 3');">3-4');">4].[2] Plaintiff was still in the shower when Deputy Thouvenell arrived at the residence and entered the bathroom with his Taser pointed at Plaintiff. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p, 4');">4]. Plaintiff exited the shower, took control of the Taser, fled the residence unclothed, and hid under a nearby mobile home. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4]. As Plaintiff was fleeing, shots were fired. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4; Doc. 3');">33');">3-3');">3, p. 2].

         Officer Brad Lunsford of the LCPD was dispatched to provide back up to the Sheriff&#3');">39;s Deputies on scene. [Doc 3');">33');">3-3');">3, p. 2]. As he was on his way to the scene, Officer Lunsford heard over his radio that shots had been fired, but it was not clear who had fired the shots. [Id.]. Officer Lunsford noticed Sheriff&#3');">39;s Deputies moving quickly around a trailer in the area. [Id.]. He then observed Plaintiff fleeing. [Id.]. Plaintiff jumped over two fences and did not respond to Officer Lunsford&#3');">39;s commands to stop. [Id.].

         Deputy Thouvenell approached Officer Lunsford and advised him that the fleeing man had battered a peace officer and instructed Officer Lunsford to shoot the man. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4; Doc. 3');">33');">3-3');">3, p. 2]. Deputy Thouvenell and Officer Lunsford both fired at Plaintiff as he continued to flee. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 5');">p. 5; Doc. 3');">33');">3-3');">3, p. 2]. Plaintiff&#3');">39;s lower right calf was struck by a bullet. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 5');">p. 5]. Plaintiff continued to flee from the police and eventually reentered Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; residence and barricaded himself inside. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 5');">p. 5; Doc. 3');">33');">3-3');">3, p. 2]. Officer Lunsford was relieved by another officer and was not involved in any subsequent efforts to apprehend or arrest Plaintiff. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, pp. 2-5; Doc. 3');">33');">3, 4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4].

         The LCPD SWAT team arrived at Ms. Gutierrez&#3');">39; residence. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-4');">4, 3');">3');">p. 3');">3');">3');">3');">p. 3');">3]. Officers repeatedly instructed Plaintiff to exit the residence, but Plaintiff remained inside. [Id.]. An Avatar SWAT robot was placed into the residence through an open window. [Id.]. Plaintiff threw the robot out of the residence. [Id.]. Officers introduced "less-than lethal" chemical agents into the residence and placed the robot back inside. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 5');">p. 5; Doc. 3');">33');">3-4');">4, 3');">3');">p. 3');">3');">3');">3');">p. 3');">3]. Through the robot&#3');">39;s monitor, officers were able to observe images of Plaintiff running through the residence with a knife and what appeared to be “some kind of a bludgeoning object” that looked like the leg of a table. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-4');">4, p3');">3');">p. 3');">3');">3');">3');">p. 3');">3-4');">4].

         The SWAT team entered the residence with a police service dog. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 6; Doc. 3');">33');">3-4');">4, 4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4]. Plaintiff was cornered in the bathroom of the residence. [Id.]. A physical confrontation ensued between Plaintiff, the police service dog, and at least one LCPD officer. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 6; Doc. 3');">33');">3-4');">4, p4');">4');">p. 4');">4');">4');">4');">p. 4');">4-5]. Plaintiff was taken into custody and transported to the University Medical Center in El Paso where he was treated for the gunshot wound to his calf and dog bites. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p. 6; Doc. 3');">33');">3-4');">4, p. 5');">p. 5; Doc. 3');">35-5, pp. 2-3');">3].

         Plaintiff was subsequently indicted on charges of battery against a household member, use of a telephone to threaten, harass or offend, aggravated battery, disarming a peace officer, aggravated assault of a peace officer; battery on a peace officer, resisting or obstructing, abuse or interference with a police animal, and kidnapping. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-6, p1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-5]. A jury found Plaintiff guilty of one count of false imprisonment, one count of battery against a household member; one count of use of a telephone to threaten, harass, annoy, or offend, two counts of battery on a peace officer; and one count of resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10, p1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-4');">4; Doc. 3');">33');">3-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-5]. Plaintiff was sentenced to nine years and one hundred eighty days of confinement in the custody of the New Mexico Corrections Department. [Doc. 3');">33');">3-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10, p1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-4');">4; Doc. 3');">33');">3-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, p1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-5].

         II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         On August 9, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the LCPD, the Doña Ana County Sheriff&#3');">39;s Department, the Doña Ana County Detention Center, Deputy Thouvenell, Officer Lunsford, Doña Ana County Sheriff Enrique “Kiki” Vigil, Chief of the LCPD, Jaime Montoya, Mayor of Las Cruces, Kenneth Daniel Gallegos Miyagishima, and Doña Ana County Detention Center administrator, Chris Barela in the First Judicial District Court of New Mexico in the County of Santa Fe. [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, pp. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-2].

         Based on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s allegations, the Court has discerned claims that appear to be raised by the Complaint under the Constitution of the United States of America, the Constitution of New Mexico, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (“NMTCA”), NMSA 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">197');">78, §§ 4');">41');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-4');">4-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 to -3');">30 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">197');">76, as amended through 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15), to wit: “(i) false arrest and false imprisonment; (ii) malicious prosecution (iii) excessive force; and (iv) failure to provide adequate and necessary medical care.” [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, p. 5');">p. 5]. The Complaint seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $4');">400, 000.00, and “exemplary and punitive damages.” [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1-1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">13');">3].

         On May 7');">7, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, the Court dismissed Plaintiff&#3');">39;s federal constitutional claims against the LCPD, the Doña Ana County Sheriff Department and the Doña Ana County Detention Center as not cognizable under 4');">42 U.S.C. § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3 (201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12). [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, p1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">p. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 24');">4]. Subsequently, on October 29, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the remaining claims against the Doña Ana County Sheriff Department and the Doña Ana County Detention Center, as well as all claims against Deputy Thouvenell pursuant to a settlement agreement between the parties.[3');">3" name="FN3');">3" id="FN3');">3">3');">3] [Doc. 26; Doc. 27');">7].

         On January 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, Defendants Lunsford, Montoya, and Miyagishima (collectively Defendants) moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s federal constitutional claims against them [Doc. 3');">33');">3] and on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s claims against them under the NMTCA [Doc. 3');">34');">4]. Defendants also moved to stay proceedings pending the Court&#3');">39;s ruling on the motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s federal constitutional claims. [Doc. 3');">35]. Plaintiff did not timely respond to the motions and on February 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, notices of completion of briefing were filed. [Doc. 3');">36; Doc. 3');">37');">7; Doc. 3');">38]. On March 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, Plaintiff filed what appears to be a response to both motions for summary judgment as well as the motion to stay, along with a motion for an extension of time to respond. [Doc. 3');">39].

         On March 25, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, Defendants filed a Reply in support of their motions for summary judgment and motion to stay. [Doc. 4');">40]. Without leave of the Court Plaintiff filed a surresponse on April 8, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19.[4');">4" name="FN4');">4" id= "FN4');">4">4');">4] [Doc. 4');">44');">4]. On April 29, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, Lunsford, Montoya, and Miyagishima moved to strike the surresponse. [Doc. 4');">45]. Subsequently, on May 20, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, Plaintiff filed a response that appears to address both summary judgment motions, the motion to stay, and the motion to strike. [Doc. 4');">46].

         III. ANALYSIS

         Dismissal of Defendants Montoya and Barela

         Defendant Montoya

         On January 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, Defendants filed a Suggestion of Death, giving notice that Defendant Montoya passed away on January 3');">3, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19. [Doc. 3');">32]. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1) provides that if a party dies during the pendency of litigation, “and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party.” Fed.R.Civ.p. 25. “A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent&#3');">39;s successor or representative.” Id. However, if “the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.” Id. (emphasis added). As an excess of 90 days has passed since the Suggestion of Death was filed and no motion for substitution of party has been made, it is recommended that Plaintiff&#3');">39;s claims against Defendant Montoya be dismissed.

         Defendant Barela

         In its May 7');">7, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court noted that Defendant Barela had not “entered an appearance even though the state court issued a summons.” [Doc. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, p. 24');">4]. At that point, it was not clear from the record whether the summons was returned executed, because the Defendants had not filed a complete copy of the state court record. [Id., pp. 24');">4-25]. As a result, the Court ordered Defendants to file a complete copy of the state court record and a status update informing the Court of the status of service of process on Barela within thirty days of the entry, of the Court&#3');">39;s Order. [Id., p. 25].

         In their status update, filed May 9, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, Defendants&#3');">39; advised the Court that the Return of Service filed in the state court action indicates that service was attempted on Barela through the Dona Ana County Detention Center by the United States Postal Service via certified, return receipt mail on August 28, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7. [Doc. 20]. According to Defendants, Barela was on indefinite administrative leave as of July 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">4, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7 and resigned on August 20, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7. [Id.]. Defendants&#3');">39; counsel could not say with certainty whether Barela was ever served with a copy of the Complaint. [Id.].

         On July 23');">3, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Show Cause and for Extension of Time to Serve and Show Process of Service on Defendant [Doc. 25], in which he detailed his efforts to locate and serve Barela up to that date and requested additional time in which to do so. On January 3');">3, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19, I granted Plaintiff&#3');">39;s request for an extension of time locate Barela, giving him 3');">30 days from the entry of the Order to provide Barela&#3');">39;s current address. [Doc. 3');">31');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1]. The Order cautioned Plaintiff that a failure to timely comply would result in dismissal of all claims against Barela. [Id.]. An excess of 90 days has passed since the Order granting Plaintiff&#3');">39;s request for an extension was filed and Plaintiff has not provided an address for Barela. Therefore, I recommend that all claims against Barela be dismissed.

         Plaintiff&#3');">39;s Untimely Responses and Request for Extension of Time

         Defendants&#3');">39; first and second motions for summary judgment and motion to stay were filed January 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19. [Doc. 3');">33');">3; Doc. 3');">34');">4; Doc. 3');">35]. Plaintiff&#3');">39;s responses to those motions were due January 29, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19. See D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7');">7.4');">4(a) (“A response must be served and filed within fourteen (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">4) calendar days after service of the motion.”). Plaintiff filed a single response to Defendants&#3');">39; first and second motions for summary judgment and motion to stay on March 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 - approximately six weeks after the expiration of the January 29, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 deadline. [Doc. 3');">39]; see D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7');">7.4');">4(a).

         Plaintiff&#3');">39;s initial March 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19 response included a general request for “a 90 day extention [sic] of time to help the remainder of the court proceedings to run smoothly without delay.” [Doc. 3');">39, pp. 2-3');">3]. Rule 6(b)(1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where a party moves for an extension after the original deadline has expired, the Court may extend the time “for good cause…if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1)(B). It is not clear whether Plaintiff is requesting that the Court excuse the late filing of his initial response or to permit him additional time in which to file a supplemental response.[5] Either way, Plaintiff&#3');">39;s request is unavailing, as he has not offered any explanation or alluded to any excusable neglect to which his untimely responses can be attributed. [See generally Doc. 3');">39]. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1)(B).

         Accordingly, I recommend that the Court disregard Plaintiff&#3');">39;s untimely responses to Defendants&#3');">39; first and second motions for summary judgment and motion to stay [Doc. 3');">39; Doc. 4');">46]. See Ogden v. San Juan County, 3');">32 F.3');">3d 4');">452');">3');">32 F.3');">3d 4');">452, 4');">455 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir.1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1994');">4) (recognizing that while the Court will liberally construe a pro-se litigant&#3');">39;s filings, “pro-se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.”).

         Defendants&#3');">39; Motion to Strike Plaintiff&#3');">39;s Surreply

         After Plaintiff&#3');">39;s initial untimely response to Defendants&#3');">39; first and second motions for summary judgment and motion to stay, Defendants filed their reply in support of all three motions on March 25, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">19. [Doc. 4');">40]. Plaintiff then filed Plaintiffs reply to defendants response to deny Summary Judgment and Request for extention [sic] of time. Also Plaintiffs Amended Response to defendants qualified Immunity motion [Doc. 4');">44');">4]. Defendants&#3');">39; filed a motion to strike Plaintiff&#3');">39;s filing, characterizing it as a surreply impermissibly filed without leave of the Court. [See generally Doc. 4');">45]. Because this filing appears to directly address Defendants&#3');">39; reply in support of their first motion for summary judgment, it is more appropriately construed as a surresponse than a surreply. Compare Black&#3');">39;s Law Dictionary 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">167');">74');">4 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th ed. 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">4) (defining “surresponse” as “[a] second response by someone who opposes a motion” and noting that “[a] surresponse (rarely allowed) comes in answer to the movant&#3');">39;s reply.”), with Id. at 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">167');">73');">3 (defining “surreply” as “[a] movant&#3');">39;s second supplemental response to another party&#3');">39;s opposition to a motion, usually in answer to a surresponse.”)

         While local rule 7');">7.4');">4(b) provides that “[t]he filing of a surreply requires leave of the Court, ” the local rules are silent as to whether leave is also required prior to filing a surresponse. D.N.M.L.R.-Civ. 7');">7.4');">4(b). “However the terms have been used interchangeably.” Ramos v. Foam Am., Inc., No. CV 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15-980, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18 WL 987');">724');">43');">3, at *3');">3 (D.N.M. Feb. 20, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18) (citing Walker v. THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Ctr., 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 WL 27');">7283');">34');">44');">4, at *1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 (D.N.M. 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1)). Nonetheless, “both local rules and local custom authorize only three pleadings to be filed: the motion, the response, and the reply.” Tellez-Giron v. Conn&#3');">39;s Appliances, Inc., No. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1:1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7-CV-01');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">107');">74');">4, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18 WL 61');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">13');">361');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, at *4');">4 (D.N.M. Jan. 29, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18); see D.N.M.L.R.-Civ. 7');">7.4');">4.

         Courts typically permit supplemental pleadings such a surresponse or surreply “where the reply presents new arguments or new evidence.” Tellez-Giron, No. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1:1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7-CV-01');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">107');">74');">4, 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">18 WL 61');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">13');">361');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1, at *4');">4; see Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12');">900 F.2d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">16 (7');">7th Cir. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1990); Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Sys., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12 WL 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">13');">32527');">7, at *1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">15 (D.N.M. 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12). Here, Defendants&#3');">39; reply in support of their first motion for summary judgment does not contain new arguments or evidence. [See generally Doc. 4');">45]. Rather, the reply addresses the untimeliness and sufficiency of Plaintiff&#3');">39;s initial response. [See id.]. Therefore, I recommend that Defendants&#3');">39; motion to strike be granted.[6]

         Defendants&#3');">39; Motions for Summary Judgment

         The Law Regarding Summary Judgment

         “Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">169 F.3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1287');">7');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">169 F.3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1287');">7, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1291');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1999); Fed.R.Civ.p. 5');">p. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and a fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Bird v. W.Valley City, 3');">32 F.3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">188');">83');">32 F.3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">188, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">199 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir. 201');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">16). Only material factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">13');">38');">226 F.3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">13');">38, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">48 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir. 2000).

         The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">44');">4 F.3');">3d 664');">4');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">14');">44');">4 F.3');">3d 664');">4, 67');">70-7');">71');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1998). If the movant carries this initial burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of a trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.” Id. at 67');">71');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1. If the nonmovant demonstrates a genuine dispute as to material facts, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to him. Ricci v. DeStefano, 7');">7 U.S. 557');">7');">557');">7 U.S. 557');">7, 586 (2009). However, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party&#3');">39;s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4');">47');">77');">7 U.S. 3');">31');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7');">4');">47');">77');">7 U.S. 3');">31');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">17');">7, 3');">322-23');">3 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1986).

         Summary judgment may not be based solely on the nonmovant&#3');">39;s failure to timely respond. See Reed v. Bennett, 3');">31');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12 F.3');">3d 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">190, 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">11');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">194');">4-95 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir. 2002) (“If the evidence produced in support of the summary judgment motion does not meet this burden, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. If the nonmoving party fails to respond, the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party&#3');">39;s submission to determine if it has met its initial burden of demonstrating that no material issues of fact remain for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If it has not, summary judgment is not appropriate, for [n]o defense to an insufficient showing is required.” (alteration and emphasis in the original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

         “Although a nonmoving party may not rely merely on the unsupported or conclusory allegations contained in his pleadings, a verified complaint may be treated as an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment if it satisfies the standards for affidavits set out in Rule 56[ ].” Conaway v. Smith, 853');">3 F.2d 7');">789, 7');">792 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">10th Cir. 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1988).

         Defendants&#3');">39; First Motion for Summary Judgment

         In their First Motion for Summary Judgment Defendants Lunsford, Montoya and Miyagishima argue that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff&#3');">39;s claims under § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3 because those claims are barred under the United States Supreme Court decision, Heck v. Humphrey, 51');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12 U.S. 4');">47');">77');">7 (1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1994');">4) and because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 3');">33');">3, pp. 8-27');">7].

         Humphrey v. Heck

         In Heck, the Court considered whether claims which call into question the lawfulness of a prisoner&#3');">39;s conviction or confinement are cognizable under § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3. See Heck, 51');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">12 U.S. at 4');">483');">3. In that case, a prisoner proceeding pro se brought claims under § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3 against a state police investigator and county prosecutors alleging that they, acting under color of state law, “had engaged in an unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation leading to [the] petitioner&#3');">39;s arrest; knowingly destroyed evidence which was exculpatory in nature and could have proved [the] [petitioner&#3');">39;s] innocence; and caused an illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure to be used at [the] petitioner&#3');">39;s trial.” Id. at 4');">47');">79 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The complaint sought, among other things, compensatory and punitive monetary damages, ” but did not seek injunctive relief or release from custody. Id.

         The Court determined that the petitioner&#3');">39;s claim in that case was analogous to the common law action for malicious prosecution, and constituted an impermissible collateral attack on his conviction. Id. at 4');">484');">4. The Court explained that the principle “that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.” Id. at 4');">486. Accordingly, the Court held that such claims were not cognizable under § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3. Id. at 4');">486-87');">7 (“We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1');">1983');">3 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such ...


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