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Casas v. Berryhill

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

March 25, 2019

MARIA D. GARCIA CASAS,, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER [1]

          STEVEN C. YARBROUGH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Social Security Administrative Record (Doc. 13) filed February 8, 2018, in support of Plaintiff Maria D. Garcia Casas' (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking review of the decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff's claim for Title II disability insurance benefits. On April 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Reverse and Remand for Rehearing With Supporting Memorandum (“Motion”). Doc. 19. The Commissioner filed a Response in opposition on June 15, 2018 (Doc. 21), and Plaintiff filed a Reply on July 20, 2018. Doc. 22. The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and the applicable law and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds the Motion is well taken and is GRANTED.

         I. Background and Procedural Record

         Claimant Maria D. Garcia Casas (“Ms. Casas”) alleges that she became disabled on March 30, 2011, [2] at the age of forty-eight because of stage I thyroid cancer and diabetes. Tr. 58 149, 449.[3] Ms. Casas completed the sixth grade in 1974, speaks only Spanish, and worked as a thrift store clothes sorter; restaurant cook and ironer; and cleaners, dry cleaners, and tuxedo rental ironer. Tr. 431-44, 448-50.

         On March 3, 2012, Ms. Casas protectively filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.[4] Tr. 363-64. Ms. Casas' application was denied on May 3, 2012. Tr. 104, 106-10. It was denied again at reconsideration on August 2, 2013. Tr. 116-27, 142, 175-77. Ms. Casas requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and ALJ Eric Weiss initially conducted a hearing on December 29, 2014. Tr. 52-79. On March 2, 2015, ALJ Weiss issued an unfavorable decision. Tr. 143-59. On March 2, 2015, the Appeals Council remanded the case to ALJ Weiss with instructions to consider Ms. Casas' maximum residual functional capacity during the entire period and to provide rationale with specific references to evidence of record, including weighing the opinion evidence and developing evidence from the claimant's treating source. Tr. 166-67. The Appeals Council further instructed the ALJ to obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the claimant's occupational base. Id. ALJ Weiss conducted a second hearing on September 8, 2016. Tr. 80-103. Ms. Casas appeared in person with her attorney representative Michael Armstrong. Id. On October 21, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. Tr. 30-45.

         On December 22, 2016, Ms. Casas submitted additional evidence to the Appeals Council from her treating physician related to her physical and mental impairments. Tr. 23-29. On September 5, 2017, the Appeals Council issued its decision denying Ms. Casas' request for review and upholding the ALJ's final decision. Tr. 1-6. On November 3, 2017, Ms. Casas timely filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. Doc. 1.

         II. Applicable Law

         A. Disability Determination Process

         An individual is considered disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (pertaining to disability insurance benefits); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A) (pertaining to supplemental security income disability benefits for adult individuals). The Social Security Commissioner has adopted the familiar five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a person satisfies the statutory criteria as follows:

(1) At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”[5] If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled regardless of his medical condition.
(2) At step two, the ALJ must determine the severity of the claimed physical or mental impairment(s). If the claimant does not have an impairment(s) or combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, she is not disabled.
(3) At step three, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's impairment(s) meets or equals in severity one of the listings described in Appendix 1 of the regulations and meets the duration requirement. If so, a claimant is presumed disabled.
(4) If, however, the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal in severity one of the listing described in Appendix 1 of the regulations, the ALJ must determine at step four whether the claimant can perform her “past relevant work.” Answering this question involves three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ considers all of the relevant medical and other evidence and determines what is “the most [claimant] can still do despite [her physical and mental] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). This is called the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of claimant's past work. Third, the ALJ determines whether, given claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of meeting those demands. A claimant who is capable of returning to past relevant work is not disabled.
(5) If the claimant does not have the RFC to perform her past relevant work, the Commissioner, at step five, must show that the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy, considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. If the Commissioner is unable to make that showing, the claimant is deemed disabled. If, however, the Commissioner is able to make the required showing, the claimant is deemed not disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (disability insurance benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (supplemental security income disability benefits); Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294, n. 5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).

         B. Standard of Review

          This Court must affirm the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits unless (1) the decision is not supported by “substantial evidence” or (2) the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards in reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004); Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01. In making these determinations, the Court “neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor substitute[s] [its] judgment for that of the agency.'” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). A decision is based on substantial evidence where it is supported by “relevant evidence . . . a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118. A decision “is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record[, ]” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118, or “constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). The agency decision must “provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005). Therefore, although an ALJ ...


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