United States District Court, D. New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTER is before the Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) on the Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 filed by Plaintiff, Kaheem Ricky Ansley, on June
13, 2018 (Doc. 1). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff
Ansley's Complaint based on immunity, failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, and as barred by the
Factual and Procedural Background
Kaheem Ricky Ansley filed his Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”) on June
13, 2018. (Doc. 1) His Complaint names, as Defendants, State
of New Mexico, Public Defender William J. Hull, Judge William
G. W. Shoobridge, and District Attorney Erik Scramlin. (Doc.
1 at 1, 3). Ansley is proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming denial of his rights and violations of the cannons
of judicial conduct arising out of his criminal conviction in
State of New Mexico, Fifth Judicial District cause no.
D-506-CR-201400231. (Doc. 1 at 2). Ansley alleges three
counts against the Defendants:
“Count I: Conflict of Interest imposed by the State of
New Mexico's Fifth Judicial District Court . . .
Count II: Conflict of Interest Imposed by the State of New
Mexico's Fifth Judicial District Attorney's Office
and the Lea County Public Defenders' Office . . .
Count III: Denial of Rights; Jurisdiction; Illegal Sentence .
(Doc. 1 at 4-5). Ansley seeks reversal of his conviction,
“Full Rights With Prejudice, ” and $9, 500,
000.00 in damages. (Doc. 1 at 6).
The Law Regarding Dismissal for Failure to State a
Ansley is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis.
The Court has the discretion to dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint sua sponte for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted under either
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the Court must accept all
well-pled factual allegations, but not conclusory,
unsupported allegations, and may not consider matters outside
the pleading. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188,
1190 (10th Cir. 1989). The court may dismiss a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if
“it is ‘patently obvious' that the plaintiff
could not prevail on the facts alleged.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting
McKinney v. Oklahoma Dep't of Human Services,
925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. A claim should be dismissed where it is legally or
factually insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) the court may dismiss the complaint at
any time if the court determines the action fails to state a
claim for relief or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The authority granted by §
1915 permits the court the unusual power to pierce the veil
of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those
claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
See also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1109. The
authority to “pierce the veil of the complaint's
factual allegations” means that a court is not bound,
as it usually is when making a determination based solely on
the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the
plaintiff's allegations. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). The court is not required to
accept the truth of the plaintiff's allegations but,
instead, may go beyond the pleadings and consider any other
materials filed by the parties, as well as court proceedings
subject to judicial notice. Denton, 504 U.S. at
reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court liberally construes
the factual allegations. See Northington v. Jackson,
973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). However, a pro se
plaintiff's pleadings are judged by the same legal
standards that apply to all litigants and a pro se plaintiff
must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San
Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.
1994). The court is not obligated to craft legal theories for
the plaintiff or to supply factual allegations to support the
plaintiff's claims. Nor may the court assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d at 1110.
Analysis of Plaintiff Ansley's Claims
Plaintiff's Claims Against Judge Shoobridge and District
Attorney Scramlin are Barred by Judicial and Prosecutorial
rights and state law claims against judicial officers acting
as judges are clearly barred by absolute judicial immunity.
See Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978);
Christensenv. Ward,916 F.2d 1462, 1473-76
(10th Cir. 1990); Hunnicutt v. Sewell,147 N.M. 272, 277-78, 219 P.3d 529, 534-45 (Ct. App. 2009).
It is well settled that the doctrine of judicial immunity is
applicable in actions, such as the case at bar, with 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims as well as state law claims.
Van Sickle v. Holloway,791 F.2d 1431, 1434-35 (10th
Cir.1986); Collins on Behalf ofCollins v.
Tabet,111 N.M. 391, 396, 806 P.2d 40, 45 (1991).