United States District Court, D. New Mexico
EARL R. MAYFIELD, Plaintiff,
CRAIG COLE, CHRIS ARAGON, and CAMERON J. GEMOE, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTER is before the Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) on the Amended Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Plaintiff Earl R. Mayfield
on November 16, 2017. (Doc. 20) (“Amended
Complaint”). The Court dismisses the Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted
and imposes a third “strike” under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Earl Mayfield is proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis. Plaintiff Mayfield instituted this action by a
letter complaint on March 9, 2017. (Doc. 1). Mayfield
subsequently amended his complaint and sent numerous filings
seeking to further amend or supplement his original filing.
(Doc. 2, 3, 6, 9, 14, 15). The Court entered a Memorandum
Opinion and Order on September 20, 2017, dismissing
Mayfield's claims for failure to state a claim under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and
granting Mayfield leave to file an amended complaint within
30 days. (Doc. 19).
did not amend his complaint within the 30 day time period.
Instead, on November 16, 2017, Mayfield filed an Emergency
Motion for Continuence (Doc. 21) and his second Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 20). His Emergency Motion sought an
extension of time to file the Amended Complaint on the
grounds that the Northeastern New Mexico Detention Facility
had delayed delivery of the Court's Memorandum Opinion
and Order to Mayfield for one and one-half months. (Doc. 21).
The Court grants Mayfield's request for an extension of
time and accepts the Amended Complaint as filed in a timely
manner. Mayfield's Emergency Motion also requested the
Court order “NENMBF and DOC to stop the delayed passing
out of and/or hinderance of mail.” (Doc. 21 at 2).
Neither NENMBF nor DOC is a party to this action and the
Court denies Mayfield's request for an order directed to
Amended Complaint, Mayfield identifies four Defendants: Chief
Classification Officer Craig Cole; Disciplinary Hearing
Officer Lt. C.J. Giermoe; Correctional Officer Sgt. Daniel Grant;
and Nurse Stephanie Westerfield. (Doc. 20 at 1-3). The
Amended Complaint consists largely of conclusory, factually
unsupported allegations of civil rights violations. (Doc. 20
at 1-4, 7-14). Mayfield's request for relief states:
For each and every violation of Plaintiff's rights
wherefore I move this Honorable Court for monetary,
compensatory, and punitive damages in the amount of $1, 000,
000. ºº and that the above mentioned Defendants and
DOC receive better training and or higher sanctions for
violations, so that no other inmate has to endure these
violations, and that CD/DOC/ACA start taking seriously the
law and care for their inmates. Better training for all staff
that State Police be call so I can press charges against Lt
CJ Gemos. And any other relief this fed court deem just, and
that CNMCF follow PLGRA when it come to grieve & appeal,
displinary action ect.”
(Doc. 20 at 14).
OF PLAINTIFF MAYFIELD'S CLAIMS
Mayfield is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has the discretion to
dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the
Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations, but not
conclusory, unsupported allegations, and may not consider
matters outside the pleading. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Dunn v.
White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989).
The court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim if “it is ‘patently
obvious' that the plaintiff could not prevail on the
facts alleged.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting McKinney v. Oklahoma
Dep't of Human Services, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th
Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim should be
dismissed where it is legally or factually insufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) the Court may dismiss the complaint at
any time if the Court determines the action fails to state a
claim for relief or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C.
§ 915(e)(2)(B)(2). The authority granted by § 1915
permits the court the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). See also Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1109. The authority to
“pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
allegations” means that a court is not bound, as it
usually is when making a determination based solely on the
pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the
plaintiff's allegations. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). The Court is not required to
accept the truth of the plaintiff's allegations but,
instead, may go beyond the pleadings and consider any other
materials filed by the parties, as well as court proceedings
subject to judicial notice. Denton, 504 U.S. at
reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court liberally construes
the factual allegations. See Northington v. Jackson,
973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). However, a pro se
plaintiff's pleadings are judged by the same legal
standards that apply to all litigants and a pro se plaintiff
must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San
Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10thCir.
1994). The Court is not obligated to craft legal theories for
the plaintiff or to supply factual allegations to support the
plaintiff's claims. Nor may the Court assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d at 1110.
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must assert acts by government officials acting
under color of law that result in a deprivation of rights
secured by the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. §
1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). There
must be a connection between official conduct and violation
of a constitutional right. Conduct that is not connected to a
constitutional violation is not actionable under Section
1983. See Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046
(10th Cir. 1998).
a civil rights action against a public official or entity may
not be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior
liability for the actions of co-workers or subordinates. A
plaintiff must plead that each government official, through
the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009). Plaintiff must allege some personal involvement by an
identified official in the alleged constitutional violation
to succeed under § 1983. Fogarty v. Gallegos,
523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). In a Section
1983 action, it is particularly important that a
plaintiff's complaint “make clear exactly
who is alleged to have done what to whom,
to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis
of the claim against him or her.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir.
2008) (emphasis in the original).
Claims Against Chief Classification Officer Craig
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Mayfield alleges:
“Mr. Cole is the Cheif Classification Officer at CNMCF
and an employee of DOC. All acted in their own individual
capacity to add and/or allow sexual contact, battery,
conspiracy, civil rights violations, due process violations,
falsified misconduct reports, and retaliation CD policy, DOC
& ACA policy, denied equal protection of the law and
cruel and unusual punishment. PREA Complain. . . .
Then the retaliation starts. I was told by medical staff that
I could obtain a grievance form from the education bldg., so
once in the ed. bldg. I encountered Creg Cole, at which time
he threatened me with a right up if I didn't leave. . . .
Also C. Cole denial me legal access, due process, I never
seen a case worker, never taken to committee before transfer,
he was an still is head classification officer from 2-2-17 to
3-17-17. Did i see a case worker or taken to committee, all
at no time did he order or answer any of 20 informal
complaints, and threat me when I try to got to his office for
a grievs, I was not allow to comply with PLGRA cause of him
Head classification officer C. Cole was and still is
responsible for the running of CNMCF on a day to day basec
yet he chose to not do his job, by turning a blind eye to lt,
sgt, Def action to be inclosed grivs and displney action
process, all these dept hes responsible for. yet he stood by
noing my USC/NMC right kept being violated. Def C. Cole even
order Sgt. Aragon to write me a misconduct report even those
I had a Id. Its wasnt from CNMDF but my Risk Ban ID
show my ...