United States District Court, D. New Mexico
WILLIAM D. PAYNE; NICOLE PAYNE; LESLIE B. BENSON; KEITH BASTIAN; JACQUELINE FERNANDEZ-QUEZADA; CASON N. HEARD; GREGORY OLDHAM and SHERRY K. WELCH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC, and BLAKE A. STAMPER, individually, Defendants.
Christopher M. Moody Repps D. Stanford Alice Kilborn Moody
& Warner, P.C. Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorneys for the
Charles J. Vigil Jeffrey L. Lowry Melanie B. Stambaugh Rodey,
Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Albuquerque, New
Mexico Attorneys for the Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Plaintiffs' Opposed
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a)(1) & (a)(2) Motion to Consolidate,
filed October 19, 2017 (Doc. 178)(“Motion to
Consolidate”); and (ii) Defendants' Motion to
Strike or Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, filed November 1,
2017 (Doc. 180)(“Motion to Strike”). The Court
held a hearing on June 5, 2018. The primary issues are: (ii)
whether the Bell v. Tri-State CareFlight, LLC, No.
CIV 17-0796 KG Stipulated Order Granting Defendants'
Motion to Transfer Related Case to Honorable James O.
Browning, filed October 6, 2017 (Doc. 15)(“Transfer
Order”), consolidated Bell v. Tri-State CareFlight,
LLC, with this case, and, if not, whether the Court
should consolidate the cases pursuant to rule 42(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (ii) whether the Court
should strike or dismiss the Plaintiffs' Third Amended
Representative and Class Action Complaint for Damages for
Violations of New Mexico Minimum Wage Act and New Mexico
Common Law, filed October 4, 2017 (Doc.
177)(“Complaint”) in light of the Court's
prior entry of Final Judgment, filed November 23, 2016 (Doc.
150). The Court concludes that: (i) the Transfer Order did
not consolidate the cases, but the Court will consolidate the
cases now; and (ii) the Court need not strike the Complaint
in light of the Final Judgment, but the Court will not
require the Defendants to answer the Complaint unless and
until the Court determines that the Complaint is operative.
Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to Consolidate and
denies the Motion to Strike.
Tri-State Careflight, LLC operates an air ambulance service
in New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Nevada. See
Complaint ¶ 11, at 4. Tri-State CareFlight operates a
fleet of aircraft, which it staffs with pilots and trained
medical personnel. See Complaint ¶ 9 at 3.
Tri-State CareFlight and Defendant Blake Stamper are or were
employers within the definition of the New Mexico Minimum
Wage Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-4-1 through 50-4-33
(“NMMWA”). Complaint ¶ 7, at 3. This case is
a wage-and-hour dispute. See Complaint ¶ 1, at
2. The Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid overtime
compensation under the NMMWA and other unpaid compensation on
a theory of unjust enrichment. See Complaint
¶¶ 95-128, at 12-18.
September, 2014, William D. Payne and Nicole Payne, “on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
” filed their original complaint against Tri-State
CareFlight and Stamper. Representative Action Complaint for
Damages for Violation of New Mexico Minimum Wage Act and
Unjust Enrichment at 1, Payne v. Tri-State Careflight,
LLC, D-101-CV-2014-02048 (First Judicial District,
County of Santa Fe, State of New Mexico)(Montes, J.), filed
November 17, 2014 in federal court (Doc. 1-1)(“Original
Complaint”). Tri-State CareFlight and Stamper removed
the case to federal court on November 17, 2014. See
Notice of Removal, filed November 17, 2014 (Doc.
1)(“Notice of Removal”). They based removal on
the Court's diversity jurisdiction. See Notice
of Removal ¶ 4, at 2.
August 24, 2015, W. Payne and N. Payne moved to amend the
Original Complaint to: (i) eliminate a claim for certain
uncompensated travel time from the Original Complaint; and
(ii) add an additional named Plaintiff -- Leslie B. Benson.
See Plaintiffs' Amended Opposed Motion for Leave
to File First Amended Complaint, filed August 24, 2015 (Doc.
44)(“First Motion to Amend”). On September 4,
2015, W. Payne and N. Payne filed Plaintiffs' Motion for
and Brief in Support of Class Certification, filed September
4, 2015 (Doc. 48)(“First Motion for Class
Cert.”). The Court held a hearing on the First
Motion to Amend on October 28, 2015. See Clerk's
Minutes, filed October 28, 2015 (Doc. 67)(“Oct. 28th
Clerk's Minutes”); Notice of Motion Hearing, filed
October 16, 2015 (Doc. 64). At an October 28, 2015, hearing,
the Court granted the First Motion to Amend. See
Oct. 28th Clerk's Minutes at 1; Order at 1, filed March
14, 2016 (Doc. 112). Later that day, W. Payne and N. Payne
filed their First Amended Representative Action Complaint for
Damages for Violation of New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, filed
October 28, 2015 (Doc. 68)(“Amended
November, 2015, W. Payne, N. Payne, and Benson resolved their
individual claims against the Defendants. On November 19,
2015, the Paynes reached a settlement with the Defendants in
which the Defendants agreed to provide them with full relief
under the NMMWA, i.e., all the relief they requested
in the Amended Complaint. See Memorandum Opinion and
Order at 47, 2016 WL 9738302, at *25, filed August 12, 2016
(Doc. 138)(“Intervenor MOO”). Benson, meanwhile,
signed a global release of his claims against Tri-State
CareFlight and Stamper on October 22, 2015. See
Settlement Agreement and General Release at 1-3 (dated
October 22, 2015), filed December 9, 2015 (Doc. 71-1).
Payne, N. Payne, and Benson's claims resolved, a new set
of named Plaintiffs -- Keith Bastian, Cason N. Heard, Gregory
Oldham, Sherry K. Welch, and Jacqueline Fernandez-Quezada --
sought to keep the case alive by intervening pursuant to rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Opposed Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiff and Class
Representatives at 1, filed December 15, 2015 (Doc.
73)(“First Intervention Motion”). In the First
Intervention Motion, the intervenors asserted:
[N]one of the currently named Plaintiffs will be able to
pursue this matter either individually or on behalf of the
putative class members who were deprived of overtime pay
pursuant to Defendants' uniform and unlawful overtime
policies applicable to flight nurses, flight paramedics and
pilots. Intervenors seek to pick up the prosecution of this
lawsuit where the current Plaintiffs are soon to depart.
Intervention Motion at 2.
First Intervention Motion was pending, the Defendants moved
the Court, pursuant to rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to enter summary judgment in their favor, and to
dismiss all claims in the Second Amended Complaint in their
entirety and with prejudice. See Defendants
Tri-State Careflight, LLC, and Blake A. Samper's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Memorandum Brief in Support at 1,
filed March 1, 2016 (Doc. 110)(“MSJ”). The
Defendants argued that federal law preempts the Named
Plaintiffs' state-law claim for the alleged NMMWA
violation and the state-law claim for unjust enrichment.
See MSJ at 1. The Named Plaintiffs opposed the
Defendants' MSJ, and also filed their Motion to Exclude
Consideration of New Law or New Argument Raised in
Defendants' Reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment or,
in the Alternative, to Permit Plaintiff to File a Surreply,
filed on May 2, 2016 (Doc. 123)(“Motion to
Exclude”), as a result of the Defendants' MSJ.
August 12, 2016, the Court, pursuant to rule 24(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, granted the First
Intervention Motion, permitting Bastian, Heard, Oldham,
Welch, and Fernandez-Quezada to intervene as Plaintiffs.
See Intervenor MOO at 1-2. The Court determined,
among other things, that the apparent resolution of W. Payne,
N. Payne, and Benson's claims “did not render this
case moot under Article III because the personal stake of the
indivisible class may inhere prior to a definitive ruling on
class certification.” Intervenor MOO at 41 (citing
Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639
F.3d 1239, 1244-47 (10th Cir. 2011)).
October, 2016, the Court denied the Defendants' MSJ,
concluding that Congress “has not preempted the field
of labor regulation for railroad and airline workers, and the
present dispute does not involve the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement.” Memorandum Opinion
and Order at 2, Payne v. Tri-State Careflight, LLC,
No. CIV 14-1044, 2016 WL 6396214, at *1 (D.N.M. Oct. 25,
2016), filed October 25, 2016 (Doc. 147)(“MSJ
MOO”). In the same ruling, the Court also determines
that “the Defendants raised a new issue of law in their
reply in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, to
which the Named Plaintiffs may reply with a surreply should
they deem it appropriate.” MSJ MOO at 2.
November 2, 2016, the Defendants offered, under rule 68 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to pay the five named
Plaintiffs -- Bastian, Heard, Oldham, Welch, and
Fernandez-Quezada -- a specific amount of money plus their
pre-offer “[a]ttorneys' fees and costs actually and
reasonably incurred.” Offer of Judgement at 1 (dated
November 2, 2016), filed November 17, 2016 (Doc.
149-1)(“Offer of Judgment”). The Offer of
Judgment states: “By accepting this Offer of Judgment,
Plaintiffs agree to the entry of the attached form of final
judgment.” Offer of Judgment at 2. The Defendants
informed the Court, on November 17, 2016, that those five
Plaintiffs accepted the Defendants' rule 68 offer.
See Notice of Acceptance of Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment at 1, filed November 17, 2016 (Doc.
149)(“Acceptance Notice”). See also
Email from Chris Moody, to Charles Vigil at 1 (dated November
16, 2016), filed November 17, 2016 (Doc.
149-1)(“Plaintiffs accept your offer of
judgment.”). The Acceptance Notice states:
Defendants hereby notify the Court that Plaintiffs have
accepted Defendants' Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. A copy of
the accepted Offer of Judgment is attached as Exhibit A, a
copy of the Form of Judgment incorporated by reference into
the Offer is attached as Exhibit B, and Plaintiff's [sic]
acceptance of the offer is attached as Exhibit C.
Notice at 1. Six days later, the Court took the
Defendants' proposed final judgment and entered it with
no changes. See Final Judgment at 1, filed November
23, 2016 (Doc. 150).
November 29, 2016, seventeen people sought to intervene in
the case as named Plaintiffs. See Opposed
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b) Motion and Supporting Memorandum to
Intervene as Parties Plaintiff and Class Representatives,
filed November 29, 2016 (Doc. 151)(“Motion to
Intervene”). On June 27, 2017, fifty-two more people
sought to intervene as named Plaintiffs into the case.
See Opposed Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(B) Supplemental Motion
and Supporting Memorandum to Intervene as Parties Plaintiffs
and Class Representatives, filed June 27, 2017 (Doc.
166)(“Supp. Motion to Intervene”).
August 3, 2017, while the Court considered the Motion to
Intervene and the Supp. Motion to Intervene, “a number
of the proposed Plaintiffs/Intervenors filed a separate, but
essentially duplicative” complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, apparently to
cover their bases vis-à-vis tolling concerns. Motion
to Consolidate at 1. See Bell v. Tri-State CareFlight,
LLC, No. CIV 17-0796 (“Bell”).
Tri-State CareFlight and Stamper moved to transfer that case,
Bell v. Tri-State CareFlight, LLC, No. CIV 17-0796
(“Bell”), from the Honorable Kenneth J.
Gonzales, United States District Judge for the District of
New Mexico, to the Court. See Bell, Defendants'
Motion to Transfer Related Case to Honorable James O.
Browning, filed September 26, 2017 (Doc. 11)(“Motion to
Transfer”). In the Motion to Transfer, the Defendants
state: “Pursuant to Rule 42(a)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Defendants Tri-State CareFlight, LLC and
Blake A. Stamper respectfully move the Court to transfer the
above-captioned case to the Honorable James O.
Browning.” Motion to Transfer at 1.
September 30, 2017, the Court granted the Motion to Intervene
and the Supp. Motion to Intervene, which added sixty-nine
current and former Tri-State CareFlight employees as named
Plaintiffs. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 60,
322 F.R.D. 647, 683, filed September 30, 2017 (Doc.
175)(“Intervention MOO”). In the Intervention
MOO, the Court states:
First, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the
sixty-nine Proposed Intervenors pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)
(“CAFA”). Second, the Named Plaintiffs'
settlement agreement did not render the Proposed Intervenors
claims moot, because their personal stake in the class --
and, therefore, an Article III case or controversy -- inhered
at the action's beginning. Third, relief from the Final
Judgment is not necessary for the Proposed Intervenors to
intervene. Fourth, the Motion to Intervene was timely, even
though the Court had already entered a Final Judgment,
because intervention will not unduly prejudice the
MOO at 2, 322 F.R.D. at 654. The Court also determines, in
the Intervention MOO, that a nonparty may, in certain
circumstances, intervene into a case in which a final
judgment has been entered. See Intervention MOO at
55-56, 322 F.R.D. at 680. The Court states:
[T]he Proposed Intervenors need not disturb the Named
Plaintiffs' Final Judgment in order to intervene; rather,
they must first intervene before they can seek relief from
Because intervention is a precondition for a nonparty to make
a rule 60(b) motion, not the other way around, the Court
concludes that the Named Plaintiffs' Final Judgment
presents no insurmountable obstacle to the Proposed
Intervenors' Motion to Intervene.
MOO at 55-56, 322 F.R.D. at 680. The Court did not make a
determination regarding whether the intervening Plaintiffs
could proceed, notwithstanding the Court's Final
Judgment, without obtaining relief from that Final Judgment
via a motion under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court also expressed its misgivings:
The Court arrives at this conclusion with reservations.
First, the Court is skeptical that most motions to intervene
after final judgment are timely, particularly here given that
the Proposed Intervenors' attorneys also represent the
Named Plaintiffs and therefore had a direct hand in reaching
the settlement and entering the Final Judgment. The Proposed
Intervenors, therefore, could not have been taken by surprise
and presumably were capable of making their motion before the
Final Judgment was entered. Second, the Court is not eager to
deprive the Defendants of the benefit of that bargain: unlike
the first settlements with the Original Plaintiffs, the
Defendants took the rule 68 route with the Named Plaintiffs
and deliberately negotiated for the Final Judgment.
See Offer of Judgment at 2 (“By accepting this
Offer of Judgment, Plaintiffs agree to the entry of the
attached form of final judgment.”). The Defendants have
not expressly stated why they bargained for the Final
Judgment, but it could be precisely for this moment. One
possibility is that, having unsuccessfully opposed the first
motion to intervene, they figured a Final Judgment might make
it harder for future intervenors. Another possibility is that
the Defendants may want to do some judge-shopping: they may
prefer to shut the case down before the Court and defend
against the remaining claims that are undoubtedly on the way
before another judge in a separate case. A third possibility
is that they may want to force their opponents to file
another case and pay another filing fee. Finally, and most
likely, the Defendants may want to take advantage of any
applicable statute of limitations and cut down on damages.
See Tr. at 15:8-10 (Lowry)(“[W]e believe there
are some people in the proposed class, assuming this proceeds
as a class action, whose claims would be barred.”). By
treating the Final Judgment like any other judgment
-- i.e., not presuming that a
post-final judgment intervention motion is untimely, or not
requiring intervenors undo the final judgment via rule 60(b)
before seeking intervention -- the
Defendants may be deprived of the benefit of their bargain.
That outcome looks a lot like prejudice. Also, simply
ignoring rule 60(b)'s plain language, as the court does
in United Airlines v. McDonald, seems misguided;
rules should be construed like statutes, and under the rules
of statutory construction, a statute's plain language
should not be overlooked. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee,
540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)(“It is well established that
when the statute's language is plain, the sole function
of the courts -- at least where the disposition required by
the text is not absurd -- is to enforce it according to its
With respect to prejudice, the Court shares Justice
Powell's misgivings expressed in his dissent in
United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385,
399-400 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
dissent asserted that allowing post-final
judgment intervention in that case unduly prejudices the
defendant, arguing that, because only named plaintiffs may
appeal a certification denial, and the settlement ended the
named plaintiffs' ability to appeal the denial, then no
one remained to make the appeal -- not even
an unnamed member of the putative class. See 432 U.S
at 399-400 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus,
the dissent asserts, “[h]aving achieved a settlement of
the case, [the defendant] was prejudiced by [the
intervenor's] attempt to reopen the case.” 432 U.S.
at 399 (Powell, J., dissenting). . The majority, meanwhile,
stated that the defendant “can hardly contend that its
ability to litigate the issue was unfairly prejudiced simply
because an appeal on behalf of putative class members was
brought by one of their own, rather than by one of the
original named plaintiffs.” 432 U.S. at 394-95 (Powell,
J., dissenting). .
The Court also shares the dissent's skepticism of the
majority's “casual treatment of the
prejudice” to a putative class action defendant who
settles with all named plaintiffs. 432 U.S. at 399 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Not only does the majority's approach
risk prejudice to a defendant, but it does so by disregarding
the judicial system's interest in settlements and
finality, see 432 U.S. at 401 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)(“The Court also ignores the important
‘principle that (s)ettlement agreements are highly
favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible
because they are a means of amicably resolving doubts . . .
and preventing lawsuits.'” (quoting Pearson v.
Ecological Sci. Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir.
1975))), and undermining public policy behind statute of
limitations, see 432 U.S. 385, 400 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)(“Considerations of policy militate strongly
against the result reached by the Court. Our cases reflect a
long tradition of respect for statutes of limitations and the
values they serve.”).
MOO at 59-60 n.18, 322 F.R.D. at 682 n.18.
the Intervention MOO, the parties' counsel began
discussing a stipulated order to be filed in Bell
vis-à-vis the Transfer Motion. On October 3, 2017, the
Defendants' counsel wrote to the Plaintiffs' counsel:
What are your thoughts, in light of your agreement to not
oppose consolidation, on the parties filing a joint motion
with Judge Garza asking to vacate the JSR deadline and the
from Charles J. Vigil, to Christopher M. Moody and Repps D.
Stanford at 3 (dated October 3, 2017), filed October 19, 2017
(Doc. 178-1). The Plaintiffs' counsel responded:
On our call we said that we would not oppose consolidation so
long as there is no appeal of the intervention order.
Thinking about it, I don't think you would have an appeal
anyway so assuming that you agree not to try an interlocutory
appeal, we are not opposing consolidation. If we are not
opposing consolidation I think it makes sense to ask Judge
Garza to vacate the JSR/scheduling conference and we submit
an order of consolidation and then proceed with case
scheduling before Judge Browning. In our experience Judge
Garza is pretty available by phone so we might want to
approach it that way.
from Christopher M. Moody, to Charles J. Vigil and Repps D.
Stanford at 3 (dated October 3, 2017), filed October 19, 2017
(Doc. 178-1). The Defendants responded: “Ok. Makes
sense. We are not appealing the intervention order.”
Email from Charles J. Vigil, to Christopher M. Moody and
Repps D. Stanford at 3 (dated October 3, 2017), filed October
19, 2017 (Doc. 178-1).
October 4, 2017, the Defendants' counsel emailed the
Plaintiffs' counsel a draft of the Stipulated Order,
asking for the Plaintiffs' counsel's thoughts.
See Email from Jeffrey L. Lowry, to Christopher M.
Moody and Repps D. Stanford at 6 (dated October 4, 2017),
filed October 19, 2017 (Doc. 178-1). The Plaintiffs'
counsel responded: “The order looks fine except that we
think it should refer to Rule 42(a)(2) rather than (a)(3).
That's the part of the rule implicated in all the class
cases involving consolidation that we have seen.” Email
from Christopher M. Moody, to Jeffrey L. Lowry and Repps D.
Stanford at 6 (dated October 4, 2017), filed October 19, 2017
(Doc. 178-1). The Defendants' counsel explained:
The motion cited Rule 42(a)(3) because it allows the most
flexibility given the unusual circumstances and status of the
two cases. Nevertheless, I don't know that we need to get
hung up on the subparagraph. If we revise the order to cite
Rule 42 without reference to any particular part of that
rule, would that be acceptable?
from Jeffrey L. Lowry, to Christopher M. Moody at 6 (dated
October 4, 2017), filed October 19, 2017 (Doc. 178-1). Later
that day, Defendants' counsel emailed Plaintiffs'
counsel: “Here are the motion and order to vacate the
Bell deadlines and scheduling conference as well as the final
version of the stipulated order on the motion to transfer
case. With your approval, I'll file / submit these
today.” Email from Jeffrey L. Lowry, to Christopher M.
Moody at 9 (dated October 4, 2017), filed October 19, 2017
(Doc. 178-1). The Plaintiffs' counsel replied:
“Looks good.” Email from Repps D. Stanford, to
Jeffrey L. Lowry and Christopher M. Moody at 9-10 (dated
October 4, 2017), filed October 19, 2017 (Doc. 178-1). On the
same day, the Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this case,
see Complaint at 1.
October 6, 2017, the Honorable Kenneth J. Gonzalez, United
States District Judge of the District of New Mexico, approved
Bell, Stipulated Order Granting Defendants'
Motion to Transfer Related Case to Honorable James O.
Browning, filed October 6, 2017 (Doc. 15) (“Transfer
Order”). The Transfer Order states that the
“Plaintiffs do not oppose” Tri-State
FlightCare's Motion to Transfer and that Judge Gonzalez
grants the Motion to Transfer. Transfer Order at 1. The
Transfer Order concludes with the following:
“Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above
captioned case be transferred to the Honorable James O.
Browning, who shall preside over all future
proceedings.” Transfer Order at 1-2.
October 16, 2017, the Plaintiffs' counsel's
paralegal, Anne Chavez, spoke with the Court's Courtroom
Deputy, Michelle Behning, to determine whether Bell
and this case had been consolidated. See Declaration
of Anne Chavez ¶¶ 4-6, at 1 (dated November 15,
2017), filed November 15, 2017 (Doc. 181-2)(“Chavez
Decl.”). Behning “confirmed that the cases had
not formally been consolidated, and suggested that a motion
to consolidate be filed if that was the direction Counsel
wished to take.” Chavez Decl. ¶ 6, at 1. That same
day, the Plaintiffs' counsel emailed the Defendants'
My paralegal spoke with Michelle at Judge Browning's
chambers this morning regarding consolidation. We filed our
reply brief on Friday only in the Bell case because we have
not received any order consolidating the two cases from Judge
Browning (just the notice from the clerk reassigning the Bell
case to Judge Browning). Michelle told us that the two cases
(Bell and Bastian or whatever we are calling it now) are not
consolidated and that if we want them consolidated we need to
file a motion. What do you think?
from Christopher M. Moody, to Charles J. Vigil and Jeffrey L.
Lowry at 10 (dated October 16, 2017), filed October 19, 2017
(Doc. 178-1). The Defendants' counsel responded:
Many thanks. Not being party to your paralegal's ex parte
communications with Judge Browning's chambers, it is
difficult for me to comment. We filed a motion to
transfer the Bell case to Judge Browning and
that is what was approved by Judge Gonzales. And, that is
what has happened -- the Bell case is no[w] assigned to Judge
Browning. It was most certainly never a motion to
consolidate. . . . In any event, we believe consolidation is
improper. To the extent Plaintiffs are entertaining making of
such a motion, please be advised that the Defendants oppose
and will oppose any motion to consolidate the two cases.
from Charles J. Vigil, to Christopher M. Moody and Jeffrey L.
Lowry at 10 (dated October 16, 2017), filed October 19, 2017
(Doc. 178-1)(emphasis in original).
The Motion ...