United States District Court, D. New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WILLIAM P JOHNSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's
Complaints for Civil Rights Violations filed in the
consolidated cases referenced above.
who is proceeding pro se, initiated six cases on May
2, 2018 against various Defendants. Because the Complaints in
each of the cases contain identical factual allegations, the
Court consolidated the cases. In addition to his civil rights
claims, the Complaints assert general conspiracy claims and
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
Court dismisses the conspiracy claims against all Defendants
for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff makes several
conclusory allegations that “Judge Strother conspir[ed]
with [Defendants]” but does not allege specific facts
showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the
defendants. Complaint ¶ 66 at 9, ¶ 102 at 11-12,
¶ 112 at 12-13, ¶ 154 at 16. “[C]onclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based .
. . [and] in analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
complaint, the court need accept as true only the
plaintiff's well-pleaded factual contentions, not his
conclusory allegations.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Defendants
pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968. RICO allows for criminal penalties,
see 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and civil remedies,
see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The Court dismisses
Plaintiff's claims for criminal penalties because
“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64
(1986). The Court dismisses Plaintiff's RICO claims for
civil remedies due to Plaintiff's lack of standing to
bring a RICO claim because Plaintiff has not alleged that he
was injured in his business or property by reason of
Defendants' alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
See Gilmor v. Thomas, 490 F.3d 791, 797 (10th Cir.
2007) (“a plaintiff has standing to bring a RICO claim
only if he was injured in his business or property by reason
of the defendant's violation of § 1962”);
Dias v. City and County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169,
1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (standing is a component of this
Court's jurisdiction, and the Court has an obligation
“to consider it sua sponte to ensure the
existence of an Article III case or controversy”).
v. Carter, No. 18cv417, and Chernoff v. Marks,
was a party to proceedings in McLennan County Court in Texas.
Defendant Carter is a “McLennan County Court
P[sych]ologist, ” and Defendant Marks is a
“McLennan County Court Psychiatrist.” Complaints
at 1. Plaintiff makes the general allegation that Defendants
Carter and Marks “[r]epeatedly found the Plaintiff
incompetent to stand trial with no proof positive, ”
and “[r]ecommended intake to North Texas State Hospital
for Premeditated Attempted Murder under the guise of
Competency Training.” Complaint ¶ 19(D) at 4.
Plaintiff later alleges that Defendants Carter and Marks
“recommend[ed] the Plaintiff go back to North Texas
State Psychiatric Hospital for Premeditated Attempted Murder
under the guise competency education.” Chernoff v.
Carter Complaint ¶ 138; Chernoff v. Marks
Complaint ¶ 137. There are no other substantive factual
allegations regarding Defendants Carter and Marks.
Court dismisses the civil rights claims against Defendants
Carter and Marks for failure to state a claim. The only
substantive allegations against Defendants Carter and Marks
are that they found Plaintiff incompetent to stand trial and
recommended that Plaintiff be admitted to North Texas State
Hospital. Those allegations, without more, are not sufficient
to state a claim for deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution or federal laws. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants are a “Court Psychologist” and a
“Court Psychiatrist.” Complaint ¶ 5 at 1.
Defendants are therefore immune from monetary damages claims.
See Sawyer v. Gorman, 317 Fed.Appx. 725, 728 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“[I]mmunity which derives from judicial
immunity may extend to persons other than a judge where
performance of judicial acts or activity as an official aid
of the judge is involved. Absolute judicial immunity has thus
been extended to non-judicial officers, like clerks of court,
where their duties had an integral relationship with the
v. Strother, No. 18cv419
Strother is a McLennan County Court Judge. See
Complaint ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff makes the general
allegations that Defendant:
1. Supported False Charges and Manufactured False Charges.
2. Repeatedly ordered the Plaintiff to be Falsely Imprisoned