on the briefs:[*]
from the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado (D.C. No. 1:16-CR-00198-LTB-1)
Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, and Howard A.
Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the
Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
C. Troyer, United States Attorney, and James C. Murphy,
Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
determine whether a conviction for federal bank robbery
categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the
elements clause of the career-offender sentencing guideline.
We conclude that it does, so exercising jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Dean McCranie pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The presentence
report (PSR) treated that conviction as a crime of violence
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Manual §
4B1.2(a)(1)-as it also did for McCranie's earlier
convictions for federal bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), and Colorado aggravated robbery, see
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-302(1)(d) (2017). With these
predicate convictions, McCranie qualified as a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). As a career
offender, McCranie's total offense level rose to 29, and
his criminal history category rose to VI. See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Under the sentencing table, the
advisory guideline range is 151 to 188 months'
sentencing hearing, McCranie objected to the PSR's
career-offender recommendation, arguing that none of his
three referenced felony convictions qualify as a crime of
violence. The district court rejected this argument. First,
it noted that under our circuit's precedent Colorado
robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Second, it reached the same conclusion
for federal bank robbery. So the district court applied the
career-offender enhancement and sentenced McCranie to a
mid-level, 175-month term of imprisonment.
appeal, McCranie raises the same issues: He claims that
neither Colorado robbery nor federal bank robbery qualify as
a crime of violence. But he "recognize[s] that this
court has held that Colorado robbery is categorically a crime
of violence."Appellant's Opening Br. at 45 (citing
United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1262, 1266
(10th Cir. 2017) (concluding that Colorado aggravated
robbery, which requires a "violent taking, "
satisfies the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) elements
clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i))); see also
United States v. Crump, 674 Fed.Appx. 802, 803 (10th
Cir. 2017) (unpublished) ("Applying the same reasoning
outlined in Harris, we conclude [the
defendant's] Colorado robbery conviction qualifies as a
crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1).").
can resolve this appeal by deciding one issue-whether federal
bank robbery by taking property by force, violence, or
intimidation qualifies categorically as a crime of violence.
If so, then McCranie qualifies as a career offender under
§ 4B1.1. We review de novo whether a prior conviction
qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a)(1). See United States v. Maldonado-Palma,
839 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2016).
district court, the government relied on only the elements
clause of § 4B1.2(a). Under that section, "[t]he
term 'crime of violence' means any offense under
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another . . . ." U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a)(1). In deciding whether McCranie's convictions
qualify as crimes of violence under this language, we must
determine whether his federal bank robbery offenses
categorically meet the crime-of-violence definition without
reference to the underlying facts of his
convictions.United States v. Armijo, 651 F.3d
1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2011). To decide if they do, we ...