United States District Court, D. New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER OF
MATTER is before the Court sua sponte on
the Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint filed by Plaintiff
Lucian Moon Patchell on May 6, 2016 (“Complaint”)
(Doc. 1). The Court previously dismissed the Complaint
without prejudice for failure to state a claim and afforded
Patchell the opportunity to amend to state a claim for
relief. (Doc. 12). Patchell has not filed an amended
complaint. The Court will now dismiss Patchell's
Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim for
relief and failure to prosecute, and will impose a
“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Failure to State a Claim:
Patchell is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis
on civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
many dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the Court accepts
well-pled factual allegations, but not conclusory,
unsupported allegations, and may not consider matters outside
the pleading. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188,
1190 (10th Cir. 1989). A claim should be dismissed
where it is legally or factually insufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570; Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) the Court may dismiss the complaint if
the Court determines the action fails to state a claim for
relief or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §
915(e)(2)(B)(2). The authority granted by § 1915 permits
the court the power to pierce the veil of the complaint's
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). See also Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1109. The Court is not required to
accept the truth of the plaintiff's allegations but may
go beyond the pleadings and consider any other materials
filed by the parties. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32-33 (1992).
the Court liberally construes the factual allegations, a pro
se plaintiff's pleadings are judged by the same legal
standards that apply to all litigants, and a pro se plaintiff
must abide by the applicable rules of court. Northington
v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992);
Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455
(10th Cir. 1994). The Court is not obligated to
craft legal theories for the plaintiff or to supply factual
allegations to support the plaintiff's claims, nor may
the Court assume the role of advocate for the pro se
litigant. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Patchell's Complaint Fails to State a Claim for §
Court has previously determined that Patchell's Complaint
fails to state a claim for relief. (Doc. 12). To state a
claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must assert acts by government officials acting under color
of law that result in a deprivation of rights secured by the
United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff must allege
some personal involvement by an identified official in the
alleged constitutional violation to succeed under §
1983. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162
(10th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff's complaint must
“make clear exactly who is alleged to have
done what to whom.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir.
2008) (emphasis in the original). Generalized allegations
against “defendants” or “officers, ”
without identification of individual actors and conduct that
caused the deprivation of a constitutional right, do not
state any claim for relief. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d at 1249-50.
Court has determined, applying the § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standards, the original Complaint filed
by Patchell fails to state a claim for relief under §
1983. Patchell alleges that on June 17, 2014 at the Taos
County Adult Detention Center, he was strip-searched in the
presence of female staff, had a mace/pepper ball gun aimed at
him, and was forced to sit “in other peoples snot,
spit, and ‘lewgies'” in violation of his
8th and 14thAmendment rights. (Doc. 1
at 2-3). Patchell does not identify any of the individual
detention facility officers actually involved in the alleged
unconstitutional acts. The Complaint does not name, and fails
to state a claim for relief against, any subordinate Taos
County Adult Detention Center official. Fogarty v.
Gallegos, 523 F.3d at 1162.
does identify “Majer Lorenzo Silva” as a
Defendant and appears to claim supervisory liability on the
part of Defendant Silva. (Doc. 1 at 1-2). Patchell alleges
Silva is “the jail commander/chief of operations at the
Taos County Adult Correctional Facility” and makes
generalized allegations that the claimed wrongful actions
were taken “while under direct order from Mr. Silva,
” “under Mr. Silva's direct supervision,
” and “under direct authority and instruction of
Majer Silva.” (Doc. 1 at 2-3). Patchell fails, however,
to allege specific facts showing personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional violations by Silva, a causal
connection between Silva's personal involvement and the
constitutional violation, or a culpable state of mind on the
part of Defendant Silva. Serna v. Colorado Dept. of
Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir.
2006); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194-96
(10th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff Patchell fails to sufficiently
state a plausible claim of supervisory liability against
Defendant Silva. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Patchell also names the Taos County Adult Detention Center as
a Defendant. The Taos County Adult Detention Center is not a
“person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the Taos
County Adult Detention Center under § 1983. Therefore,
the claims against the Taos County Adult Detention Center
fail to state a claim for relief and will be dismissed.
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 63-64 (1989).
Patchell Failed to Amend his Complaint:
Court granted Patchell a reasonable opportunity to remedy
defects in his pleading. See Doc. 12. See, also,
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1109; Reynoldson v.
Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir.
1990). The Court also notified Patchell that, if he failed to
file an amended complaint, the Court may dismiss this action
with prejudice and without further notice. (Doc. 12 at 6-7).
The Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order was returned to
the Court as undeliverable. (Doc. 13). Therefore, the Court
re-mailed the Memorandum Opinion and Order to Plaintiff
Patchell on November 15, 2017. Upon receipt of the Memorandum
Opinion and Order, rather than filing an amended complaint,
Patchell chose to file a letter requesting reconsideration of
the Court's ruling. (Doc. 15).
Court construes Plaintiff Patchell's November 27, 2012
request as a motion for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P.
59(e). Grounds warranting reconsideration under Rule 59(e)
include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2)
new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See
Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941,
948 (10th Cir.1995). A motion for reconsideration is not
appropriate to revisit issues already addressed in prior
filings. See Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d
1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991); Servants of Paraclete v.
Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
request for reconsideration does not identify any change in
controlling law, new evidence that was previously
unavailable, or clear error that must be corrected to prevent
manifest injustice. Instead, Patchell continues to reiterate
his vague allegations that Major Lorenzo Silva “was the
actor spoken of in the Complaint.” (Doc. 15). He,
again, does not specify facts sufficient to show not only
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations
by Silva, but a causal connection between Silva's
personal involvement and the constitutional violation, or a
culpable state of mind on the part of Defendant Silva.
Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d at
1151; Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1194-96.
2010). Patchell's letter ...