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Jaquez v. Berryhill

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

December 1, 2017

RAYMOND JAQUEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,[1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          STEPHAN M. VIDMAR, United States Magistrate Judge

         THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse and Remand for a Rehearing with Supporting Memorandum [Doc. 16] (“Motion”), filed on July 11, 2017. The Commissioner responded on September 18, 2017. [Doc. 20]. Plaintiff replied on October 2, 2017. [Doc. 21]. The parties have consented to the undersigned's entering final judgment in this case. [Doc. 8]. Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) impermissibly failed to explain why he rejected portions of Dr. Walker's and Dr. Castro's opinions. Accordingly, the Motion will be granted and the case remanded for further proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four).

         Standard of Review

         The standard of review in a Social Security appeal is whether the Commissioner's final decision[2] is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Maes v. Astrue, 522 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2008). If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings and the correct legal standards were applied, the Commissioner's decision stands and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004). Courts must meticulously review the entire record, but may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute their judgment for that of the Commissioner. Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007).

         “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118. The decision “is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it.” Id. While a court may not re-weigh the evidence or try the issues de novo, its examination of the record as a whole must include “anything that may undercut or detract from the [Commissioner]'s findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005). “The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the] findings from being supported by substantial evidence.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)).

         “The failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         Applicable Law and Sequential Evaluation Process

         In order to qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).

         When considering a disability application, the Commissioner is required to use a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). At the first four steps of the evaluation process, the claimant must show: (1) he is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; and (2) he has a “severe medically determinable . . . impairment . . . or a combination of impairments” that has lasted or is expected to last for at least one year; and (3) his impairment(s) either meet or equal one of the “Listings”[3]of presumptively disabling impairments; or (4) he is unable to perform his “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i-iv), 416.920(a)(4)(i-iv); Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261. If he cannot show that his impairment meets or equals a Listing, but he proves that he is unable to perform his “past relevant work, ” the burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner, at step five, to show that the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy, considering his residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience. Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261.

         Procedural Background

         Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on July 6, 2012, and for supplemental security income on September 26, 2012. Tr. 10. He alleged a disability-onset date of January 1, 2007. Id. His claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. ALJ Barry O'Melinn held a hearing on April 20, 2015, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Tr. 10, 46-74. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by an attorney. Tr. 10, 46, 49. The ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert, Leslie J. White. Tr. 10, 68-73.

         The ALJ issued his unfavorable decision on June 23, 2015. Tr. 23. Initially, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2009. Tr. 12. At step one he found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset date of his alleged disability. Id. Because Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity for at least 12 months, the ALJ proceeded to step two. Id. There he found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: “affective disorder; anxiety; schizophrenia; obesity; right shoulder disorder; back disorder; and hepatitis c.” Id. At step three the ALJ determined that none of Plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled a Listing. Tr. 13-15.

         Because none of Plaintiff's impairments met or medically equaled a Listing, the ALJ went on to assess Plaintiff's RFC. Tr. 15-20. The ALJ found that:

[Plaintiff] has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. ยงยง] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), occasionally lifting and/or carrying up to 20 pounds, frequently lifting and/or carrying up to 10 pounds, standing and/or walking with normal breaks for a total of at least six hours in an eight hour workday, sitting for at least six hours in an eight hour work day. [Plaintiff] is limited to never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but could frequently climb ramps or stairs. [Plaintiff] has no limitation in the ability to balance, but could only occasionally stoop, frequently kneel, occasionally crouch, and frequently crawl. Additionally, [Plaintiff] is limited to frequent bilateral overhead reaching. [Plaintiff]'s push and pull operation of hand and foot controls is unlimited, except as limited in lifting or carrying. Moreover, [Plaintiff] is limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions and making commensurate work-related decisions. [Plaintiff] can respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and work situations, deal with routine changes in work setting, maintain concentration, persistence and pace for up to and ...

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