United States District Court, D. New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M.
CHRISTINA ARMIJO, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS
MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs39;
Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion Entered
9/20/06 [Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66]. The Court has considered the
parties39; submissions, the relevant law, and has otherwise
been fully advised in the matter. For the following reasons,
the Court hereby DENIES the Motion.
BACKGROUND
The
parties are familiar with the background of this case, and
thus the Court will not address it in detail. In short,
Plaintiffs, a married couple, were aggressively treated for
Lyme disease by Dr. Carol Ann Ryser in 2006 and 2007. [Doc.
3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23, pp. 5-7, 1');">17] Their insurance carrier, and subsequently
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), denied payment for
many tests and treatments ordered by Dr. Ryser on the grounds
that they were not medically necessary. [Doc. 3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23, p. 2');">p. 2] This
Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in
December, 201');">13, in relevant part concluding that OPM failed
to state why it rejected the aggressive treatment Plaintiffs
received for Lyme disease, which was consistent with
International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society (ILADS)
Guidelines, which were a part of the record. [Doc. 3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23, p. 60');">p. 60]
Absent from the record was evidence supporting the conclusion
that Plaintiffs39; tests and treatments did not meet the
criteria for being medically necessary, i.e., that they were
inconsistent with standards of good medical practice in the
United States. [Doc. 3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23, pp. 60');">p. 60-61');">1] Accordingly, the Court
remanded the case to OPM for OPM to “develop a record
which indicates the standards of good practice in the United
States in sufficient detail to make an informed, reasoned
decision about whether or not Dr. Ryser39;s treatment
conformed to that standard.” [Doc. 3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23, p. 61');">1');">p. 61');">1]
In
October, 201');">15, OPM issued its second Final Decision, again
denying benefits for many treatments as not medically
necessary. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enforce, and
argued that the October 201');">15 Final Decision did not comply
with the Court39;s December 201');">13 Memorandum Opinion and
Order. [Doc. 45; Doc. 49] The Court granted-in-part and
denied-in-part Plaintiffs39; Motion to Enforce on
September 20, 201');">16. [Doc. 65] On October 1');">17, 201');">16, Plaintiffs
filed the present Motion for Reconsideration of the
Opinion Entered 9/20/201');">16. [Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66] Additional
background, as necessary, is set forth below.
ANALYSIS
Standard
of Review
Rule
59(e) provides for motions to “alter or amend” a
judgment if the motion is filed within twenty-eight days of
the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Although a final judgment
consistent with Rule 58 was not entered in this case,
Plaintiff39;s Motion is properly considered under
Rule 59(e) because the Memorandum Opinion and Order
at issue disposed of all issues and remanded the case. [Doc.
65, 3');">p. 3');">3');">p. 32');">3');">p. 3');">3');">p. 32] See Wagoner v. Wagoner, 38 F.2d 1');">11');">120');">938 F.2d 1');">11');">120,
1');">11');">122-3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23 (1');">10th Cir. 1');">1991');">1) (holding that, though the Court had
not yet entered a judgment, a motion to reconsider an order
that “dismissed plaintiff39;s complaint with
prejudice” was “properly deemed filed pursuant to
Rule 59(e)”); Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725');">874 F.2d 725,
726 (1');">10th Cir. 1');">1989) (stating that a motion to alter judgment
may be filed under Rule 59 “before a formal judgment
has been entered” under Rule 58); but cf. Trujillo
v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 21');">12
F.App39;x 760, 765 (1');">10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished decision)
(stating that the district court has the discretion to revise
its interlocutory rulings, including an order granting
summary judgment for the last remaining defendant, prior to
entry of a judgment, without applying the stricter standards
of Rule 59(e)).
“Rule
59(e) relief is available in limited circumstances, including
[when there is] ‘(1');">1) an intervening change in the
controlling law, (2) . . . new evidence previously [which
was] unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.39;” Hayes Family
Trust v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 845 F.3d 997');">845 F.3d 997,
1');">1004 (1');">10th Cir. 201');">17) (quoting Servants of the Paraclete
v. Does, 3d 1');">1005');">204 F.3d 1');">1005, 1');">101');">12 (1');">10th Cir. 2000)).
“[A] motion for reconsideration is appropriate where
the court has misapprehended the facts, a party39;s
position, or the controlling law. . . . It is not
appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance
arguments that could have been raised in prior
briefing.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d
at 1');">101');">12 (internal citations omitted).
Discussion
Plaintiffs
primarily argue that OPM did not fulfill its duty, as set
forth in Gunderson v. United States Department of
Labor, 1');">1 F.3d 1');">101');">13');">601');">1 F.3d 1');">101');">13, 1');">1022-3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23');">3');">23 (1');">10th Cir. 201');">10), to
provide an analysis and reason for favoring one scientific
theory over the other. [Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66, 3');">p. 3');">3');">p. 3] In particular,
Plaintiffs argue that OPM39;s October 201');">15 Final Decision
“completely fails to mention the opposing view,
particularly the updated 201');">14 ILADS Guidelines.” [Doc.
66');">66');">66');">66, 3');">p. 3');">3');">p. 3] Plaintiffs argue that the “Court should have
required OPM to discuss the two competing approaches to IV
[intravenous] treatment of Lyme disease.” [Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66, p.
4]
This
argument simply rehashes an argument Plaintiffs made
previously. In their Reply brief, Plaintiffs argued,
inter alia, that OPM “refuses to acknowledge
the existence of chronic long-term Lyme disease or the ILADS
Guidelines, and therefore the medical necessity for the
testing or treatment of any such disease.” [Doc. 49, p.
4] Accordingly, Plaintiffs39; argument in the present
motion is an inappropriate attempt to “revisit issues
already addressed, ” and thus this argument is not a
basis for relief under Rule 59(e). Servants of the
Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1');">101');">12.
Plaintiffs
argue that OPM “failed to even include or mention the
submittal of the significant, published, highly researched
[ILADS] Guidelines, which replaced the IDSA
[Infectious Disease Society of America] guidelines, upon
which OPM relies, at the National Guidelines Center.”
[Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66, p. 6] Plaintiffs submit that they sent OPM a
document identifying a link to the ILADS Guidelines on
September 25, 201');">15. [Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66, p3');">p. 3');">3');">p. 3-4; Doc. 66');">66');">66');">66-1');">1, 3');">p. 3');">3');">p. 3]
Though Plaintiffs made this argument prior to the Court
issuing its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court
did not address the argument and thus the Court will construe
this argument as one falling within the category of being
made “to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204
F.3d at 1');">101');">12.
Gunderson
sets the standard which OPM was required to meet in
determining whether the treatments were medically necessary.
Gunderson, 601');">1 F.3d at 1');">1022. “[C]ourts
generally afford [deference] to agency action that implicates
scientific and technical judgments within the scope of agency
expertise. . . . They have a corresponding obligation to use
that skill when evaluating technical evidence.”
Id. (internal quotation marks, citations and
emphasis omitted). “[C]oncomitant with the
[Administrative Law Judge's] duty to resolve all
conflicts in the medical evidence is the responsibility to
provide some ...