APPEAL
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY Manuel L.
Arrieta, District Judge
Holcomb Law Office Dina E. Holcomb Albuquerque, NM for
Appellant
Youtz
& Valdez, P.C. Shane Youtz Stephen Curtice James A.
Montalbano Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, JUDGE
{1}
The County has appealed from the confirmation of an
arbitration award. We previously issued a notice of proposed
summary disposition, proposing to affirm. The County has
filed a memorandum in opposition, and the Union has filed a
memorandum in support. After due consideration, we adhere to
our initial assessment. We therefore affirm.
{2}
The County has raised three issues, variously challenging the
arbitrator's decision on grounds that it is unsupported,
contrary to law, and/or in excess of the arbitrator's
powers. [DS 5-6; MIO 4-15]
{3}
In the calendar notice we observed that it is not entirely
clear whether the appeal should be said to entail review of
compulsory or voluntary arbitration proceedings. [CN 2-3]
However, we observed that given the district court's
explicit adoption of the heightened standard advocated by the
County, [RP 757] it did not appear to be strictly necessary
to conclusively resolve that question. [CN 3]
{4}
In its memorandum in opposition the County contends that the
district court "strayed from the standard" [MIO 5]
that it purported to apply, by proceeding on the
misapprehension that the parties were bound by the
arbitrator's legal and factual findings and by relying on
authorities in which a different standard of review was
applied. [MIO 5-6] We are unpersuaded.
{5}
The district court's decision reflects that it was well
aware of the different standards of review, and it clearly
applied the heightened standard set forth in Board of
Education of Carlsbad Municipal Schools. v. Harrell,
1994-NMSC-096, ¶¶ 25, 51, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d
511 (providing that compulsory arbitration must comport with
due process, which entails "a decision based on the
record with a statement of reasons for the decision[, ]"
and holding that "the scope of review constitutionally
required for compulsory arbitration . . . requires a
determination whether the . . . decision is arbitrary,
unlawful, unreasonable, capricious, or not based on
substantial evidence" (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). [RP 756-57] The district court's
analysis does not reflect any presupposition that the parties
were bound by the legal or factual findings, and its
discussion of the various published authorities, including
State v. American Federation of State, County, &
Municipal Employees, Council 18, 2012-NMCA-114, 291 P.3d
600, recognized the distinguishing and limiting features of
each case. [RP 758-60] We therefore reject the County's
suggestion that the district court failed to apply the
standard that it explicitly adopted.
{6}
Turning to the merits, the County continues to argue that the
arbitrator's decision was unsupported. [MIO 6-7] We do
not understand the County to contend that the
arbitrator's lengthy and comprehensive decision was not
based on the record or lacked a statement of reasons, but
rather, that it was unsupported by substantial evidence when
the whole record is taken into consideration. [MIO 6-7]
However, as we previously observed, [CN 3] the record before
us reflects that the arbitrator did in fact consider the
evidence with care. [RP 3-86] Although the County contends
that the arbitrator "ignored" some of the
conflicting evidence that was presented, [MIO 6-7] the more
reasonable inference is that the arbitrator deemed that
evidence less compelling. See generally Tom Growney
Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 137 N.M.
497, 113 P.3d 320 ("Where the testimony is conflicting,
the issue on appeal is not whether there is evidence to
support a contrary result, but rather whether the evidence
supports the findings of the trier of fact."(internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{7}
The County also renews its argument that the arbitrator and
the district court failed to recognize that the award is
contrary to law, insofar as it will require re-appropriation
of funds. [MIO 7-15] However, as we previously observed [CN
4] and as the County acknowledges, [MIO 13] the underlying
evidence on this point was conflicting. We perceive no basis
for disturbing the resolution of that conflict on appeal.
See id.
{8}
The County takes issue with the arbitrator's election to
take into consideration funding associated with both a gross
receipts tax resolution and a subsequent supplemental
resolution. [MIO 10, 13-15] We understand the County to argue
that the gross receipts tax monies, a stated portion of which
was explicitly earmarked for "salaries and equipment,
" [RP 765] should not be regarded as a specific
appropriation. [MIO 14] However, in light of the clear
reference to "salaries, " we perceive no basis for
reversal. We also understand the County to continue to
challenge the projected revenue associated with gross
receipts tax resolution. [MIO 14] Again, we cannot re-weigh
the conflicting evidence on this point. See id.
Ultimately, insofar as evidence was presented that sufficient
funds had in fact been appropriated to accommodate the
Union's last best offer, the award is not contrary to
law. See, e.g., AFSCME, Council 18,
2012-NMCA-114, ¶¶ 20-32 (rejecting a series of
arguments that an arbitrator had exceeded his authority by
selecting a last, best offer which would allegedly require
further appropriation or re-appropriation of funds, where the
arbitrator in fact determined that sufficient funds had been
appropriated to meet the relevant obligations).
{9}
The County further argues that the inclusion of permissive
subjects of bargaining and one or more allegedly illegal
subjects should have rendered the Union's last best offer
invalid, such that the arbitrator was precluded from making
an award on that basis. [MIO 15] However, the County fails to
explain why the savings clause should be regarded as
inadequate to rectify the alleged illegalities. [CN 4; MIO
15] We therefore remain unpersuaded that the award is
contrary to law.
{10}
In light of the foregoing, we deem it unnecessary to address
the County's third issue, advanced pursuant to the
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