United States District Court, D. New Mexico
ORDER GRANTING § 406(b) ATTORNEY FEES
MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion
for an award of $14, 112.00 in attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1). Doc. 31 . Defendant declined to
take a position with regard to the reasonableness of the
requested award. Being fully advised in the premises, the
Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion is well-taken and
should be granted.
instituted an action in this Court seeking judicial review of
Defendant's denial of his application for Social Security
disability benefits. This Court reversed the decision of the
Commissioner and remanded for a new hearing and awarded EAJA
fees in the amount of $5, 900.00. See Doc.30.
Following this Court's remand, the Social Security
Administration found Plaintiff to be disabled and awarded
$80, 448.00 in past due benefits, but withheld twenty-five
percent of those benefits, $20, 112.00, in the event that
Plaintiff's counsel were to bring a claim for attorney
fees pursuant to the retainer agreement. Plaintiff's
counsel now seeks authorization from this Court for an award
of compensation for legal services in an amount significantly
less than that withheld.
court renders a judgment favorable to a Social Security
claimant who was represented before the court by an attorney,
the court may allow “a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of twenty-five percent (25%) of
the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Unlike EAJA
fees, which are paid in addition to past-due benefits, §
406(b) fees are paid out of past-due benefits. Wrenn ex
rel. Wrenn v. Astrue, 525 F.3d 931, 933-34 (10th Cir.
2008). If fees are awarded under both EAJA and § 406(b),
the attorney must refund the lesser award to the claimant.
Id. at 934. The court may award fees under §
406(b) when “the court remands . . . a case for further
proceedings and the Commissioner ultimately determines that
the claimant is entitled to an award of past-due
benefits.” McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493-96
(10th Cir. 2006).
§ 406(b) does not prohibit contingency fee agreements,
it renders them unenforceable to the extent that they provide
for fees exceeding twenty-five percent (25%) of the past-due
benefits. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 798, 807
(2002). Section 406(b) also requires the court to act as
“an independent check” to ensure that fees are
reasonable even if they are less than twenty-five percent
(25%) of the past-due benefits because there is no
presumption that twenty-five percent (25%) is reasonable.
Id. at 807 n. 17. Counsel has the burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of the fees. Id. at
807. The reasonableness determination is “based on the
character of the representation and the results the
representative achieved.” Id. at 808. Factors
relevant to the reasonableness of the fee request include:
(1) whether the attorney's representation was
substandard; (2) whether the attorney was responsible for any
delay in resolution of the case; and (3) whether the
contingency fee is disproportionately large in comparison to
the amount of time spent on the case. Id. A court
may require the claimant's attorney to submit a record of
the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of
the lawyer's normal billing rate for non-contingency fee
cases. Id. The statute does not specify a deadline
for requesting fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
The Tenth Circuit, however, has held that a request
“should be filed within a reasonable time of the
Commissioner's decision awarding benefits.”
McGraw, 450 F.3d at 505.
case, the Court finds that the legal representation by
Michael D. Armstrong of Plaintiff was more than adequate, and
it obtained a fully favorable decision. Counsel did not delay
the proceedings before this Court. The instant Motion was
filed within a reasonable time after Plaintiff received
notice of entitlement to past-due benefits. The Court further
finds that the requested fees are significantly below the
twenty-five percent (25%) permitted by the retainer agreement
and proportionate given the amount of time (32.9 hours) spent
on the case. The requested attorney fees would therefore be
in line with other fee awards authorized in this District
under 406(b). See e.g., Marquez v. Astrue, CIV
10-1165 CG (awarding $10, 105 for 18.9 hours, or $529.00 per
hour); Dimas v. Astrue, CIV 03-1157 RHS (awarding
$17, 000 for 38.26 hours or $444.23 per hour). Having
performed its “independent check” duties, the
Court finds the requested award to be both appropriate and
IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for
attorney fees under § 406(b) is
granted. The Court hereby authorizes $14,
112.00 in attorney fees for legal services rendered in United
States District Court, to be paid by the Social Security
Administration. Plaintiffs counsel will then reimburse
Plaintiff the EAJA award of $5, 900.00.
 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill is
therefore substituted for Acting Commissioner Carolyn ...