United States District Court, D. New Mexico
TIMOTHY RAY SADLER a/k/a SALAH AL-DIN YUSSUF IBN AYYUB, et al JOHN/JANE DOES, Plaintiffs,
STATE OF MONTANA, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
MATTER is before the Court sua sponte under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the
Civil Rights Complaint filed by Plaintiff, Timothy Ray
Sadler, on July 3, 2017 (Doc. 1) (“Complaint”).
The Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim and as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Sadler is proceeding pro se and apparently seeks to proceed
in forma pauperis. (Doc. 1 at 4). The Court has the
discretion to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
the Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations, but
not conclusory, unsupported allegations, and may not consider
matters outside the pleading. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Dunn v. White,
880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989). The court
may dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim if “it is ‘patently obvious'
that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts
alleged.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109
(10th Cir. 1991) (quoting McKinney v. Oklahoma Dep't
of Human Services, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)).
A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim should be
dismissed where it is legally or factually insufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 Under § 1915(e)(2)(B) the court may dismiss
the complaint at any time if the court determines the action
fails to state a claim for relief or is frivolous or
malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The authority
granted by § 1915 permits the court the unusual power to
pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327 (1989). See also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at
1109. The authority to “pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations” means that a court
is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination
based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the
truth of the plaintiff's allegations. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). The court is not
required to accept the truth of the plaintiff's
allegations but, instead, may go beyond the pleadings and
consider any other materials filed by the parties, as well as
court proceedings subject to judicial notice.
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33.
reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court liberally construes
the factual allegations. See Northington v. Jackson,
973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). However, a pro se
plaintiff's pleadings are judged by the same legal
standards that apply to all litigants and a pro se plaintiff
must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San
Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10thCir.
1994). The court is not obligated to craft legal theories for
the plaintiff or to supply factual allegations to support the
plaintiff's claims. Nor may the court assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d at 1110.
deciding whether to dismiss the complaint, in whole or in
part, the court is to consider whether to allow plaintiff an
opportunity to amend the complaint. Pro se plaintiffs should
be given a reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in their
pleadings. Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124,
126 (10th Cir. 1990). The opportunity to amend
should be granted unless amendment would be futile. Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1109. An amendment is futile if
the amended claims would also be subject to immediate
dismissal under the rule 12(b)(6) or § 1915(e)(2)(B)
standards. Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901
(10th Cir. 2004).
state a civil rights claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, a plaintiff must assert acts by government officials
acting under color of law that result in a deprivation of
rights secured by the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
There must be a connection between official conduct and
violation of a constitutional right. Conduct that is not
connected to a constitutional violation is not actionable
under Section 1983. See Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d
1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must
plead that each government official, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009). Plaintiff must allege some personal involvement by an
identified official in the alleged constitutional violation
to succeed under § 1983. Fogarty v. Gallegos,
523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). In a Section
1983 action, it is particularly important that a
plaintiff's complaint “make clear exactly
who is alleged to have done what to whom,
to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis
of the claim against him or her.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir.
2008) (emphasis in the original).
Sadler mailed his Complaint to this Court, but claims he is
seeking to proceed “In the International Court of
Justice in the Netherlands.” (Doc. 1 at 1). His listing
of the parties runs for four single-spaced pages, and he
names a wide variety of Defendants ranging from the
“State of Montana” to “Area 51” to
“other truckstops around the United States” to
the “Knights Templar” to the “Roman
Empire”. (Doc. 1 at 1-4). He describes his cause of
action as a “world wise universal class action ranging
from a 42 U.S.C. Title 42/18 and U.S.C. § 1983 and
ranging up to a 1987 up to a 2000 for conspiracy and
criminal conspiracy and governmental and military conspiracy
as well at which has murdered, robbed, raped, kidnapped,
coerced, aided, abided conspired on and against, enhanced via
crystalight, endomorphic, fishtank bram or fram
(indecipherable) and nano and darpa and other enhancements,
at which is all verifiable world wide via documentations, via
satellite, newspapers, computers, and phones looking for
Timothy Ray Sadler, aka Timothy Ray Hernandez Sadler aka
Salah al-din-yussuf ibn Ayyub.” (Doc. 1 at 4).
the listing of Defendants in his Complaint implicates
thousands, if not millions, of individuals, he does not make
even a single allegation of individual conduct by any
individual official, nor does it claim any violation of any
constitutional right. See Doc. 1 at 4. The Complaint
wholly fails to state a claim for relief against any
defendant. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d at 1249-50. The Court
also finds the claims asserted by Sadler are frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The allegations are clearly
delusional and baseless. A complaint plainly abusive of the
judicial process is properly typed frivolous within the
context of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Duhart v.
Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 477-78 (10th Cir.
1972); Olson v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 726, 728-29
(10th Cir. 1993). The Court will dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim and as frivolous.
Court will also dismiss without granting Sadler leave to
amend. Although he does include some vaguely identified New
Mexico defendants in his Complaint, he makes no factual
allegations against any New Mexico official or entity. There
is no suggestion that any amended claim he might assert would
state a claim for relief. To the extent his Complaint
attempts to assert claims against officials, entities, or
properties outside New Mexico, it is unlikely this Court
could ever acquire jurisdiction over them. Any amended
complaint would still be subject to dismissal by this Court
and, therefore, granting leave to amend would be futile.
Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901.
ORDERED that the on the Civil Rights Complaint filed by
Plaintiff, Timothy Ray Sadler, on July 3, 2017 (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and ...