United States District Court, D. New Mexico
ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING
STEPHAN M. VIDMAR United States Magistrate Judge
MATTER is before me on several motions for attorney fees and
sanctions, [Docs. 87, 126, 155, 158, 175, 177], as referred
by the Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit
Judge, who is presiding in this case, [Doc. 191]. All the
motions request monetary awards pursuant to 43 U.S.C. §
1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court's inherent
§ 1988, attorney fees can only be awarded to a defendant
who prevails on civil rights claims that are
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”
Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1581
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.
5, 14 (1980)). Whereas under § 1927, “[a]ny
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” Most
of the movants had hoped the Court would resolve first
whether fees were warranted at all. Then, if the movants were
successful, they had hoped to litigate the amount of
the fees at that time. Although such a two-step process may
be permissible, the Court declines to review the evidence
piecemeal. The Court will require each movant to present
evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees
requested, and to specify the amount of fees requested under
each individual source of authority, e.g., § 1988,
general, “[t]o determine the reasonableness of a fee
request, a court must begin by calculating the so-called
‘lodestar amount' of a fee, and a claimant is
entitled to the presumption that this lodestar amount
reflects a ‘reasonable' fee.” Robinson v.
City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998).
The lodestar is “‘the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate, ' which produces a presumptively reasonable fee
that may in rare circumstances be adjusted to account for the
presence of special circumstances.” Anchondo v.
Anderson, Crenshaw & Assoc., LLC, 616 F.3d 1098,
1102 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hensley v. Ekerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), and Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel.
Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 543-44 (2010)). “The party
requesting attorney fees bears the burden of proving”
the two components used to calculate the fee award: (i)
“the amount of hours spent on the case;” and (ii)
“the appropriate hourly rates.” United
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d
1219, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000). Once the Court makes these two
determinations, the fee “claimant is entitled to the
presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a
‘reasonable' fee.” Robinson, 160
F.3d at 1281; see Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012,
1018 (10th Cir. 1996). The party entitled to fees must
provide the district court with sufficient information to
evaluate prevailing market rates. See Lippoldt v.
Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006)).
the party must also demonstrate that the rates are similar to
rates for similar services by “lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience, and reputation” in the
relevant community and for similar work. Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); see Case v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1255-56 (10th
Cir. 1998). Only if the district court does not have adequate
evidence of prevailing market rates for attorney's fees,
may it, “in its discretion, use other relevant factors,
including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.”
Case, 157 F.3d at 1257; see also United
Phosphorus, 205 F.3d at 1234 (A court abuses its
discretion when its “decision makes no reference to the
evidence presented by either party on prevailing market
rate[, ]” and its rate decision is based solely on the
court's “own familiarity with the relevant rates in
THEREFORE ORDERED that supplemental briefs be filed by the
movants no later than May 17, 2017. See [Docs. 87,
126, 155, 158, 175, 177]. If Plaintiffs wish to respond, each
such response is due within 14 days of the filing of each
respective supplemental brief. The scope of any such response
is limited to the evidence and arguments presented in the
respective supplemental brief.
 All the claims and counterclaims have
been dismissed. See [Docs. 8, 69, 76, 81, 91, 112,
121, 137, 144, 168, 169, 174, 188]. All that remains are
several motions for fees. See [Docs. 87, 126, 155,
158, 175, 177]. Plaintiff's counsel has moved to
substitute Plaintiff/Counter-defendant Susan Gerard with her
estate because she has passed away, but the motion is opposed
and remains pending. See [Docs. 187, 192].
 Defendant Garcia's original
Application for Award of Attorney's Fees [Doc. 126]
includes evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the
fees he requests, as well as a specific amount requested
under each source of authority. Accordingly, Defendant Garcia
may elect to rely on his original ...