United States District Court, D. New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This
matter comes before the Court on appeal from the judgment of
conviction and sentence of United States Magistrate Judge
Stephan M. Vidmar. The Appellant, Defendant Laney, was
convicted at a bench trial of failing to stop a vehicle when
directed to do so by United States Forest Service (USFS) Law
Enforcement Officer Christopher Mandrick (FSO Mandrick) in
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(m).[1] Judge Vidmar
sentenced the Defendant to penalties in the amount of
$135.[2] Having reviewed the appeal and briefs, the
Court affirms the judgment of conviction and sentence entered
by Judge Vidmar.
I.
Standard of Review.
“A
defendant may appeal a magistrate judge's judgment of
conviction or sentence to a district judge within 14 days of
its entry.” F . R. C . P. 58(g)(2)(B). “The
defendant is not ED RIM[3] entitled to a trial de novo by
a district judge. The scope of the appeal is the same as in
an appeal to the court of appeals from a judgment entered by
a district judge.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(D).
The
Court will review de novo the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which a defendant was convicted, considering
only whether a reasonable jury could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the direct and
circumstantial evidence, taken with the reasonable inferences
drawn from such evidence, and viewed in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v.
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted). Instead of examining the evidence in parts, the
Court “evaluate[s] the sufficiency of the evidence by
considering the collective inferences to be drawn from the
evidence as a whole.” United States v. Bader,
678 F.3d 858, 873 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Moreover, the Court's review of the
evidence presented by the government at trial is
“highly deferential” and does not involve
assessing witness credibility or weighing conflicting
evidence, as those tasks are reserved for the jury.
United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1076 (10th
Cir. 2008).
II.
Background.
On July
20, 2016, Defendant appeared for a bench trial before Judge
Vidmar to face charges for interfering with a forest officer
under 36 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)[4] (Count 1) and failing to stop a
vehicle when directed by a forest officer in violation of 36
C.F.R. § 261.10(m) (Count 2). (Doc. 58 at 7). Judge
Vidmar found Defendant not guilty of Count 1, but guilty of
Count 2. Id.
On the
afternoon of January 11, 2015, FSO Mandrick was on duty and
traveling southbound on United States Highway 180 (Highway
180) in the Gila National Forest in a fully- marked USFS
patrol vehicle. (Doc. 57 at 13-14). Near mile marker 15, FSO
Mandrick observed a brown Ford pickup truck approaching from
behind him at a high rate of speed. Id. at 16. The
vehicle “tailgated” FSO Mandrick's patrol
vehicle for approximately four miles before passing FSO
Mandrick and another vehicle that was in front of FSO
Mandrick near mile marker 19. Id. at 18-19. FSO
Mandrick activated his patrol vehicle's overhead lights
and the vehicle directly in front of FSO Mandrick immediately
pulled over and stopped. Id. at 20. FSO Mandrick
accelerated and continued pursuing the brown Ford.
Id. He also activated his patrol vehicle's
sirens. Id. Near mile marker 21, the driver of the
brown Ford (identified as Defendant) crossed the oncoming
lane of traffic and finally pulled over on the left side of
the road near a parked Catron County sheriff's deputy.
Id. at 21. The entire interaction between FSO
Mandrick and Defendant took place within the boundaries of
the Gila National Forest. Id. at 11.
III.
Defendant's Argument.
Defendant
alleges that Judge Vidmar erred as a matter of law by failing
to evaluate whether FSO Mandrick had the proper authority to
stop Defendant on Highway 180. (Doc. 58 at 7-8). Although
Highway 180 runs through USFS land, it is not specifically
designated as a “National Forest System road or
trail” pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 261.2. (Doc. 58 at
4). The parties agree that the prohibition against
“[f]ailing to stop a vehicle when directed to do so by
a Forest Officer” applies when the act occurs in the
National Forest System or on a National Forest System road or
trail, and when the act “affects, threatens, or
endangers a person using, or engaged in the protection,
improvement or administration of the National Forest System
or a National Forest System road or trail.” 36 C.F.R.
§ 261.1(a)(1), (3).
Defendant
argues that because the regulations contain both the terms
“National Forest System” and
“National Forest System road, ” each
term must be given a distinct and substantive effect. (Doc.
58 at 13) (emphasis added). In other words, “[i]f a
Forest Service officer had authority to effect a stop for any
reason on any road that ran through a National Forest -
despite such road being established as a county or state road
- the inclusion of ‘National Forest System
road' in section 261.1 would be
unnecessary” and “the use of the phrase
‘National Forest System' would then be
sufficient to confer authority and jurisdiction on such
Forest Service officers in any part of a National Forest
regardless of a road's separate status.”
Id. (emphasis added). Defendant claims that because
U.S. Highway 180 is neither a “National Forest System
road, ” nor part of the “National Forest
System, ” FSO Mandrick did not have any
authority to stop Defendant. Id. at 9 (emphasis
added). Defendant asserts that the government failed to prove
that FSO Mandrick had proper authority for the stop, which
was an essential element of the offense for which Defendant
was convicted; therefore, his conviction should be overturned
and the case dismissed. Id. at 7.
IV.
Analysis.
a.
Whether FSO Mandrick Had The Authority To Stop
Defendant.
Defendant
attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from the
limited available case law, arguing that Defendant's acts
occurred on a state-owned and controlled highway, not on
National Forest System lands, i.e. National Forest
System or National Forest System road or trail. (Doc. 58 at
10) (emphasis added). In Parker, one of the only
cases on point, a defendant was convicted of two counts of
conducting a “work activity or service” on USFS
land without proper authorization and one count of
interfering with a FSO engaged in the performance of his
duties. United States v. Parker, 761 F.3d 986 (9th
Cir. 2014). According to Defendant, the Court found
jurisdiction and authority in Parker based on the
fact that the activities took place on “National
Forest land at the side of the Salmon la Sac
highway.” (Doc. 58 at 10) (citing Parker,
761 F.3d at 990-91). Defendant also argues that in the
present case, there is no “nexus between
Defendant's alleged activity and protection of the Forest
system, nor did the Court even evaluate this critical element
even though the matter was thoroughly briefed.”
Id. at 11.
Defendant
applies the law in Parker far too narrowly. First,
the Forest Service has broad authority to regulate federal
lands. United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 641
(9th Cir. 1988). Second, the Court in Parker
concluded that, “[t]he prohibitions of Part 261 apply
when an act or omission occurs in the National
Forest System…” Parker, 761
F.3d at 989 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). Third, “[i]t is well
established that the Property Clause of the Constitution
grants to the United States power to regulate conduct on
non federal lands when reasonably necessary to
protect adjacent federal property…” Id.
at 990 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). As the
Ninth Circuit specifically explained in Parker, a
right-of-way or an easement could remove a road from the
definition of a “National Forest System road, ”
without depriving the USFS of authority over the road.
Id. “[E]xempting roads subject to an easement
from the definition of ‘National Forest System road or
trail' was expressly meant not to ‘in any way
affect the Forest Service's jurisdiction to enforce
traffic laws, to protect NFS lands underlying routes, or
to regulate use, including use on valid
rights-of-way.'” Id. (quoting Travel
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