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Ellis v. Franco

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

March 8, 2017

GENE G. ELLIS, Plaintiff,


         THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (PF&RD) by Chief Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen (Doc. 76), filed on February 6, 2017, and Plaintiff's Objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (Doc. 77), filed on February 23, 2017. The Court, having conducted a de novo review, overrules Plaintiff's objections and adopts the recommendation of the Chief Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 68), filed December 19, 2016, will be denied.

         I. Standard of Review

         “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), when a party objects to a magistrate[ judge's] ruling on non-dispositive matters the district court must ‘modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.'” Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2015). On the other hand, “[i]f the district court refers dispositive matters to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation . . . the district court ‘must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3)). “[T]he difference between a de novo review of a record and a review under the clearly erroneous standard is significant.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988). Under de novo review, “[t]he district judge is free to follow a magistrate's recommendation or wholly to ignore it” whereas “[t]he clearly erroneous standard . . . requires that the reviewing court affirm unless it ‘on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'” Id. (quoted authority omitted).

         “Notwithstanding Rule 72's clear division between dispositive and non-dispositive matters, [the Tenth Circuit has] held that ‘motions not designated on their face as dispositive are nevertheless to be treated as such a motion when they have an identical effect.'” Birch, 812 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Ocelot Oil Corp., 847 F.2d at 1462). The Tenth Circuit has not decided in a published opinion whether a motion to amend the complaint is dispositive and declined to do so in Birch. Id. at 1247. One district court considering the issue ruled that portions of a motion to amend seeking to add parties was dispositive while an amendment to claimed damages was not. See Nitchman v. Union Pacific R. Co., Inc., 05-cv-01219-EWN-MEH, 2006 WL 2781416, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2006). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has generally treated motions to amend as non-dispositive in its unpublished opinions. See Lewis v. Clark, 663 F. App'x 697, 702 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); Franke v. ARUP Laboratories, Inc., 390 F. App'x 822, 828 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); Strope v. Collins, 315 F. App'x 57, 61 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). And other Circuits have explicitly held that motions to amend are not dispositive. See Patel v. Meridian Health Sys., Inc., No. 15-3859, 2016 WL 6694545, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2016) (unpublished) (citations omitted).

         Given these authorities, the Court is initially inclined to view Plaintiff's Motion to Amend as nondispositive, meaning that the clearly erroneous standard applies. However, out of an abundance of caution the Court will proceed under the de novo standard, as either standard leads to the same result.

         II. Background

         Plaintiff initiated this case on September 23, 2015. Doc. 1. Thereafter, he amended and supplemented his Civil Rights Complaint no less than eleven times, with the most recent supplementation filed January 21, 2016. See Docs. 1, 7, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 34, 37, 44, 45. In his Complaint and supplements, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to transfer him out of the Penitentiary of New Mexico's general population, where he claims he is subject to assault due to his sex offender status. See Docs. 1, 11, 25. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Vigil retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment after the present lawsuit was filed. See Docs. 16, 17, 25.

         After this Court addressed Plaintiff's claims for emergency relief, on September 8, 2016, the Chief Magistrate Judge ordered the Defendants to file a supplemental report pursuant to Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 320 (10th Cir. 1978), to investigate the incidents underlying Plaintiff's lawsuit. Doc. 62. Defendants' Martinez Report was originally due on December 7, 2016, but they were granted a brief extension to December 30, 2016. See Docs. 62, 66. In the interim, on December 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed the present motion seeking to further amend his Complaint. Doc. 68.

         In his Motion, Plaintiff requests leave to amend his Complaint to name four additional Defendants, add additional claims against two of these individuals, and substantially increase his claims for compensatory and punitive damages. See Doc. 68.

         III. Analysis

         As the Chief Magistrate Judge recognized, at this stage in litigation a party must seek leave of the court to amend his complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). While the Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires[, ]” id., refusing leave to amend is justified upon a showing of “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of the amendment.” Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1313 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). The Chief Magistrate Judge recommended denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend on the grounds of undue delay, undue prejudice, and futility of the amendment. Doc. 76 at 4-8. The Court will address each in turn.

         A) Undue Delay

         As the Chief Magistrate Judge noted, “'undue delay' may be an appropriate justification for denying a motion to amend.” Cohen, 621 F.3d at 1313 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). This is especially true where “the party filing the motion has no adequate explanation for the delay.” Frank v. U.S. W., Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “Furthermore, where the party seeking amendment knows or should have known of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but fails to include them in the original complaint, the motion to amend is subject to denial.” Id. at 1366 (quoted authority omitted).

         The Chief Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff's delay in seeking leave to amend was undue because his proposed amendment was filed eleven months after his most recent supplementation, without explanation for the delay, and alleges facts and claims that were known to Plaintiff since this case's inception. Doc. 76 at 4-5. Plaintiff's objections to the PF&RD do not explain why he delayed in seeking leave to amend. See Doc. 77. In fact, as to Plaintiff's proposed claim against Officers Sutton and Oroz, Plaintiff admits in his objections that he was aware of the identities of the officers at the time they allegedly assaulted him. Id. at 1. Plaintiff also does not dispute that he was aware of the ...

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