United States District Court, D. New Mexico
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On
August 22, 2016, Plaintiff Juanita Garcia filed a Motion for
Costs and Application for Attorney's Fees and Expenses
(ECF No. 173). The Court, having considered the motion,
briefs, evidence, applicable law, and otherwise being fully
advised, concludes that the motion should be granted in part
and denied in part. The Court will enter an award of
attorney's fees, expenses, and costs, but will reduce the
requested amount, as described herein.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May
9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint with six
causes of action. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 35. On March 13,
2015, the Court granted Defendant summary judgment on
Plaintiff's retaliation claims (Counts III and IV) and
prima facie tort (Count V). Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 88.
The Court held a five-day bench trial on February 22-26,
2016, on Plaintiff's three remaining claims. After trial,
the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in
which the Court found for Plaintiff and against Defendant on
Ms. Garcia's hostile work environment claim (Count II)
and awarded her $20, 000.00 in compensatory damages. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 33-39, ECF No. 169. The Court
also concluded, “Ms. Garcia is entitled to her
reasonable attorney's fees and costs on her Title VII
hostile work environment claim. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k).” Id. at 39. The Court, however,
found for Defendant and against Plaintiff on Ms. Garcia's
claims for failure to promote (Count I), breach of the
settlement agreement (Count VI). Id. 29-33, 39-41.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Attorney's Fees
The
court may award a prevailing party in a Title VII proceeding
“a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert
fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k). Determining a reasonable award of attorney's
fees is a two-step process: first, the court must determine
whether an applicant is a prevailing party entitled to
reimbursement of her fees; and second, the court must
determine what fee is reasonable. Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).[1] “[A]
plaintiff ‘prevails' ‘when actual relief on
the merits of his claim materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.'” Browder v. City of Moab, 427
F.3d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992)). This Court already
determined that Plaintiff prevailed on her hostile work
environment claim and is entitled to a reasonable fee award.
In
order to arrive at a reasonable fee, courts generally use the
“lodestar amount, ” which is the “product
of the number of attorney hours ‘reasonably
expended' and a ‘reasonable hourly
rate.'” Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160
F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433). The fee applicant has the burden of showing
entitlement to the award and documenting the appropriate
hours expended and hourly rates. Case v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998). The
district court may reduce the award where the documentation
of hours is inadequate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
Records must reveal all hours for which the attorney seeks
compensation and how the attorney allotted those hours to
specific tasks. Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281. A court
may reduce the lodestar calculation where the prevailing part
achieved only partial success. See Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 435-37. “The district court may attempt to identify
specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply
reduce the award to account for the limited success.”
Id. at 436-37.
1.
Hours Reasonably Expended by Plaintiff's Counsel
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff did not differentiate in her
attorney's fees request which hours counsel spent on the
successful hostile work environment claim, as opposed to the
unsuccessful claims. Defendant urges the Court to deny
Plaintiff fees entirely. Despite that the Attorney Time
Records and Expenses are not as detailed regarding certain
line items as desired by the Court, in general they are
sufficient, when considered with the other evidence, to
determine that a significant portion of counsel's time
was reasonably expended in litigation of the hostile work
environment claim.
Nevertheless,
the Court finds that a percentage reduction of hours is fair
and reasonable in this case in light of Plaintiff's
failure to prevail on the failure to promote and breach of
settlement agreement claims, claims this Court found to be
without merit. Much of the evidentiary support for the
unsuccessful claims was distinct from the hostile work
environment claim, making them largely unrelated.
Plaintiffs' billing records, however, are not so detailed
to enable the Court to carve out with specificity work that
was only pertinent to the failure-to-promote and breach of
contract claims. The Court thus will use its discretion to
use a percentage reduction to account for Plaintiff's
limited success on the merits. See Browder, 427 F.3d
at 723 (explaining that court should only award prevailing
plaintiff attorney's fees for time spent prosecuting
successful claim and those related to it).
Plaintiff
only met with success with one out of five initial claims,
and the result was not one of complete vindication for
Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the thrust of this case was the
hostile work environment claim and that claim was the more
significant issue in the case. For example, in
Plaintiff's Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (ECF No. 165), approximately 2/3 of
document relates to the hostile work environment claim, while
1/3 relates to the unsuccessful claims. The majority of
witnesses had testimony to offer on the hostile work
environment claim. The Court finds that this general pattern
bore out at trial and litigation as a whole. Moreover,
reviewing the time records, a sizeable portion of
counsel's time was devoted generally to litigation as a
whole. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff should
recover 67% of the total attorney's and paralegal fees to
account for her significant, yet limited success on the
merits.
Because
the Court's deduction will account for Mr. Mozes's
own reduction, the Court finds that reasonable hours for Mr.
Mozes expended in litigating the hostile work environment
claim amounted to 378.82 hours (565.4 hours x 0.67). This
result is a reasonable, commensurate fee in light of the
relative success obtained.
2.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
A court
should establish an hourly rate award based on what the
evidence shows the market commands for lawyers of comparable
skill and experience practicing in the area of civil rights
or analogous litigation. See Case, 157 F.3d at
1255-56. Mr. Mozes seeks $325 per hour, although he
acknowledges that his standard hour fee rate is $300, but he
has considered raising that rate. Aff. of Michael Mozes
¶ 17, ECF No. 173-3. Mr. Mozes has been a practicing
attorney for over 20 years with considerable experience in
civil rights work. See Id. ¶¶ 5-9. He has
attached the Affidavit of Charles Archuleta, an experienced
civil rights attorney in the New Mexico legal community, who
avers that a $325 hourly rate is a fair and reasonable fee
for the services rendered by attorneys like Mr. Mozes in
Albuquerque. See Aff. of Charles Archuleta,
¶¶ 1-4, 9, ECF No. 173-6. The Court finds, based on
the evidence, that an hourly rate of $300, the amount Mr.
Mozes has been charging his clients, is reasonable for an
attorney with similar experience and skill in this market
area. See Case, 157 F.3d at 1257 (explaining reasons
why plaintiff's counsel in civil rights may be paid more
than counsel representing governmental entity); Calderon
v. Herrera et al., No. Civ. 2011-0482 WJ/GBW, at 2
(D.N.M. June 20, 2012) (awarding $300 hourly rate for
experienced attorney); Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw,
& Associates, LLC, No. Civ. 08-0202 RB/WPL, at 3
(D.N.M. Oct. 19, 2010) (same).
3.
Total Attorney's Fees
The
Court finds that the amount for attorney's fees is $133,
646.00 (378.82 hours x $300). Using the 7.3125 current GRT
for Albuquerque, as Mr. Mozes has done without objection, the
tax amounts to $9, 772.86. The total attorney's fee award
is thus $143, 418.86 for Mr. Mozes's work on the hostile
work environment claim.
B.
Paralegal Fees
The
Court will likewise adjust downward the paralegal hours,
awarding 67% of the requested hours (164 hours x 0.67 =
109.88 hours). See Aff. of Norma L. Mozes, ECF No.
173-5. The Court finds that the requested $85 hourly fee for
Norma Mozes's paralegal work is reasonable in the local
market area. See id.; Aff. of Michael Mozes ΒΆ
19, ECF No. 173-3. Consequently, the Court ...